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The Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) is one o f the key components o f the 
trade reform agenda in Central America. 1 Producers in the region gain preferred access to the 
U.S. market for a wide range o f products; at the same time, tariffs and nontariff barriers 
protecting them from lower cost U.S. products are reduced. Supporters o f CAFTA hold that the 
reduction o f most remaining barriers to trade between the Central American countries and the 
United States will lead to greater efficiency, increased exports, and higher growth rates for the 
region. Yet many observers remain skeptical about the supposed benefits o f CAFTA. They point 
out that for agricultural commodities Central America already has been granted preferred access 
to the U.S. market under the Caribbean Basin Initiative, signed in 1983 and broadened under 
several later agreements. Some feel that under the CAFTA agreement the protections afforded to 
their own farmers, particularly smallholders and producers o f basic commodities such as beans, 
corn, pork, chicken and rice, will be significantly reduced. The loss o f these protections could 
negatively affect the incomes o f the poor, offsetting all or part o f the gains elsewhere in the 
economy.
The purpose o f this paper is to shed some light on this debate, first by looking closely at 
the agreement to see what the changes in protection and access to the U.S. market mean for 
Honduras. Second, we use a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model and a microsimulation 
model to simulate the impact that the CAFTA changes in tariffs and quotas are likely to have on 
producers, wages, national income, and poverty in Honduras.
CAFTA originally included five Central American countries: Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. The treaty was later expanded to include the Dominican Republic 
(DR).
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II. PATTERNS OF PROTECTION AND TRADE PRIOR TO CAFTA
In order to appreciate the likely impact o f CAFTA on the economy o f Honduras, it is useful to 
look at the level o f protection prior to CAFTA and also at production trends in key sectors o f the 
economy. Table 1 displays statistics on trends in production and tariffs since 1990. As can be 
seen in the right hand columns, Honduras underwent a fairly dramatic period o f trade 
liberalization in the early 1990s— well before the CAFTA agreement. In 1990, Honduras had the 
highest tariffs in Central America; five years later its tariffs were the lowest in the region. Based 
on this history and given the relatively low level o f tariffs in 1999, it seems likely that CAFTA’s 
impact will not be too great. However, its impact on particular sectors and commodities could be 
high, especially where levels o f protection were still high in 2005 when the CAFTA agreement 
was signed. To get a sense o f how important that could be, one has to look at the disaggregated 
tariff data in detail, which we shall do in a moment. But first consider the sectoral production and 
trade data in Table 1.
Trade liberalization does not appear to have been much o f  a boon to the Honduran 
economy. Between 1990 and 2004 per capita income rose by just 0.5 percent per year, one o f the 
slowest growth rates in all Latin America. This performance did not reflect low investment. 
Indeed, according to the table, trade liberalization was accompanied by a significant increase in 
the share o f capital formation in gross domestic product (GDP). Nor was it due to a failure to 
increase exports. The export share increased slightly over the decade when measured in current 
prices and much more when measured in constant prices. Rather, the opening o f the economy led 
to a massive increase in the import share, which was not balanced by an equivalent increase in 
exports, leading to an increase in the trade deficit.
Looking at trends in the sectoral composition o f output, it is evident that the share o f  
agriculture contracts sharply and manufacturing increases. Both reflect the rise o f the maquila 
sector. Honduras has the largest and fastest growing maquila sector in Central America. By 2005, 
maquila comprised 27 percent o f total exports, and its value added contributed 36 percent to 
industrial production (Banco Central de Honduras 2006). Meanwhile agriculture managed to 
grow by only 1.3 percent per year after 1995, reflecting low prices for its main export crops, 
natural disasters, and an exchange rate increasingly affected by maquila.
Honduras does not have high tariffs on industrial commodities. Thus the CAFTA tariff 
reductions will primarily affect agriculture. Yet, as the table indicates, this is a sector that had 
already suffered a severe decline in the years before CAFTA. Whether the positive effect of 
opening the United States to Honduran exports will offset the negative effect of further reducing 
tariffs on agricultural commodities in Honduras is a key question to be answered in this paper.
Table 1
HONDURAS NATIONAL ACCOUNT DATA
Shares (current prices)
GDP/capita I/Y X/Y M/Y Ag. Mfg. Constr. Utilities Mining Svc.
Tariff data
Average Dispersion
1990 685.7 0.202 0.372 0.399 0.200 0.145 0.046 0.028 0.015 0.566 0.419 0.218
1995 700.4 0.240 0.437 0.481 0.187 0.155 0.048 0.047 0.017 0.546 0.097 0.075
1997 0.097 0.054
1999 0.081 0.078
2000 713.6 0.261 0.413 0.552 0.140 0.170 0.046 0.041 0.017 0.585
2001 714.2 0.238 0.378 0.542 0.122 0.177 0.043 0.038 0.016 0.604
2002 714.2 0.222 0.380 0.531 0.119 0.182 0.037 0.039 0.017 0.606
2003 720.7 0.234 0.383 0.549 0.113 0.183 0.041 0.042 0.017 0.605
2004 738.7 0.248 0.397 0.588 0.115 0.181 0.037 0.042 0.016 0.609
Source: ECLAC, Anuario Estadístico. Shares for 2004 are estimates based on a chain index from 2003 using country data from ECLAC. 
Estudio Económico. Tariff data are from Lederman and others (2002).
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The CAFTA treaty specifies precisely how tariffs on all commodities traded between the 
signatories are going to be eliminated or reduced over time. For each country, the agreement 
contains a long and detailed list o f commodities, including both the current most favored nation 
(MFN) tariff and a tariff category to which the commodity has been assigned. 2 These categories 
determine how fast tariffs will be reduced over time. Table 2 shows the categories that are 
relevant to Honduras.
Table 2
1. Trade liberalization under CAFTA
TARIFF CATEGORIES UNDER CAFTA
Category
A Immediate tariff reduction to zero
B Linear reduction of tariffs to zero over five years
C Linear reduction of tariffs over ten years.
D Linear reduction of tariffs over fifteen years
E Six Year grace period, then reduction of 33% over next four years, then full liberalization from 12th to 
15th year.
F Ten year grace period, then linear reduction to zero over the next ten years.
G Goods in this category already have zero tariff rate
H Goods in this category are excluded from tariff reductions under CAFTA, with tariffs remaining at 
the rates agreed to in WTO.
M Non-linear reduction in tariffs to zero. 2% in 1st year, 8% per year from 3rd to 6th year and 16% per 
year from 7th to 10th year.
N Elimination of tariffs in 12 equal annual steps.
O Six year grace period and then elimination in nine non-linear steps, 40% from 7th to 11th year and 
60% from 12th to 15th year.
P Ten year grace period, then elimination over 7 years. 33% from 11th to the 14th year and 67% from the 
15th to the 18th year.
Source: CAFTA-DR Treaty.
For a subset o f sensitive agricultural products, CAFTA also expands a system o f tariff 
rate quotas (TRQs) originally set up under the World Trade Organization (WTO), which define 
amounts o f certain commodities that can be imported free o f tariffs. 3 In addition, for many 
products, safeguard provisions permit a country to apply the MFN tariff level if  imports from the
2 The reader should note that formally CAFTA only reduces Honduran tariffs on goods 
imported from the United States. In this paper, for simplicity, we treat the CAFTA tariff reductions as if 
they applied to all imported commodities. This implies that our estimates of the effects of tariff reductions 
overstate the impact. The reason for this simplifying assumption is that the tariff rates are so low that the 
differences between the true effect and the estimates are necessarily small.
3 These are products that are politically sensitive because they are or produced or consumed by 
the poor.
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United States to that country, or imports from the country to the United States, exceed the 
safeguard level. Safeguards are provisions permitted under WTO (and the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade) by which imports beyond the safeguard level can be temporarily restricted if  
the affected industry can show that it will suffer serious injury. In most cases, the safeguard-level 
tariffs fall over time.
2. Changes in the protection of agriculture-based products under CAFTA
We now turn our attention to changes in the level o f protection o f agricultural commodities under 
CAFTA (Table 3). Once the CAFTA commodities are divided into categories according to the 
time profile o f programmed tariff reductions under the agreement, the amount o f trade in each o f  
the tariff categories for all agricultural and processed agricultural products can be determined, as 
well as the level and changes in the average tariff in each o f the categories. For example, in 
category A, tariffs are eliminated immediately, while in B they are reduced to zero in five equal 
installments over the first 5 years and in C over the first 10 years. Note that these are all weighted 
averages o f individual tariff rates, where the share o f the commodity in total imports determines 
the weight. It is well known, however, that this method o f averaging can seriously underestimate 
the average level o f protection, when tariffs are so high that they choke off imports. The last 
category in each table is comprised o f all the commodities that have quotas, which in Honduras is 
mainly yellow corn, chicken, and dairy products.
Certain commodities, like beans, corn, and rice, are o f particular importance to either 
income or consumption o f the poor or both. We use the information on tariff categories and 
initial tariffs in Table 2 to calculate the time path o f tariff reductions for a number o f these 
politically sensitive commodities and show the results in the second half o f Table 3. Note that the 
table shows only the tariff level, not the impact o f quotas, which will be discussed later.
Other than white corn in several countries, tariff protection for all o f these sensitive 
products will disappear over the next 20 years. But for most products, liberalization will be very 
gradual, much o f it occurring at least 10 years after the treaty goes into effect. This is important. 
In Central America, many have protested that CAFTA will hurt small farmers by reducing 
protection o f commodities o f particular importance to smallholders and the poor. The evidence in 
the table makes it quite clear that this will not be the case, at least for the first 5 to 10 years. It 
seems that the Honduran negotiators o f CAFTA were not willing to impose a shock treatment on 
the producers o f these sensitive commodities. But it is also clear that over the long run, the 
reductions in tariffs for these commodities are considerable. Domestic producers are given a 
fairly long time to adopt new crops or new and more efficient production techniques. But in the 
long run, they will have to adjust to a far lower level o f protection, particularly in rice, beans, 
poultry, and dairy products.
The table also makes clear the high level o f protection afforded to domestic producers o f  
sensitive products, particularly dairy, poultry, and rice. 4 This pattern may, at least to some extent 
reflect the desire o f Central American governments to protect their producers from subsidized
This pattern is observed both in Honduras and in other Central American countries (Morley
2006).
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exports from the United States. A recent study estimated that subsidies in the United States 
amounted to 41 percent o f the value o f production o f rice, 50 percent o f milk, and 32 percent of 
corn (Monge, Sagot and González, 2004).
Table 3
TARIFF LEVELS OVER TIME IN CAFTA






CAFTA First year 5th year 10th year 15 th year
A 26 000 192 298 365 0.127 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
B 5 908 30 360 124 0.140 0.112 0.000 0.000 0.000
C 15 670 9 227 175 0.166 0.149 0.083 0.000 0.000
D 16 685 50 656 137 0.147 0.137 0.098 0.049 0.000
F 78 10 7 0.150 0.150 0.150 0.150 0.075
G 107 545 830 235 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 4 510 0 10 0.139 0.127 0.081 0.023 0.000
O 869 379 4 0.150 0.150 0.150 0.090 0.000
Quota 50 482 1 514 33 0.416 0.416 0.416 0.416 0.277
Total 227 747 0.136 0.119 0.107 0.097 0.061
Total without rice and yellow corn 0.072
Tariffs on sensitive commodities
Pre
CAFTA First year 5th year 10th year 15 th year 20th year
Yellow corn 0.450 0.450 0.302 0.000 0.000
White
corn 0.450 0.450 0.450 0.450 0.450 0.450
Rice 0.450 0.450 0.450 0.450 0.252 0.000
Beans 0.150 0.140 0.103 0.050 0.000 0.000
Beef 0.150 0.120 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pork 0.150 0.150 0.150 0.090 0.000 0.000
Poultry 0.549 0.520 0.455 0.411 0.230 0.000
Dairy 0.121 0.118 0.116 0.113 0.055 0.000
Source: Morley (2006).
Tariffs in categories A and B  are either eliminated immediately or over the first five years 
of the agreement. Products in these categories broadly include prime cuts o f beef, fish, flowers, 
various fresh fruits and vegetables, potatoes, and inputs to processed foods such as soups and dog 
food. For the most part, these are not products in which U.S. imports compete with local 
producers. For fish, fruits, and vegetables, it is unlikely that U.S. prices would be competitive 
with local products, even at a zero tariff. The picture in beef is more complicated. Central 
American cattle growers do not now produce prime cuts o f beef, so the increase in tariff-free 
imports should have little effect on local producers. In fact, because CAFTA grants beef import 
quotas in the United States, the treaty is on balance likely to be favorable to them.
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Category C commodities are those with a 10-year linear tariff reduction schedule. This 
group is composed primarily o f processed foods. D and F category commodities have a gradual 
reduction o f tariff protection over either 15 or 20 years. Thus whatever impact CAFTA will have 
on producers in these two categories will necessarily be quite drawn out. The bulk o f D category 
products are what could be called processed agricultural commodities, such as animal or 
vegetable fats, candies and other products made from sugar, products made from chocolate, 
leather, flour, beverages, and vegetables or fruits. In Honduras, the category also includes 
potatoes and some beans. The F category where there is a 10-year grace period followed by a 
10-year tariff elimination is composed completely o f dairy products.
The table tells us that the treatment o f different agricultural commodities under CAFTA is 
anything but uniform. More than half o f imports either had no protection prior to CAFTA 
(category G) or had tariff rates set to zero upon ratification o f the agreement. A second group of 
commodities will have their tariffs lowered, but the process will be quite gradual. Finally, for 
several sensitive commodities such as white corn, rice, poultry, and dairy products, tariffs are 
either not lowered at all, or not lowered significantly until at least 10 years after ratification.
We now allocate these tariff reductions across the sectors that we are going to use in the 
CGE-based simulations presented later in the paper (Table 4). As in the previous tables, the 
average tariffs shown are the weighted averages o f individual commodity tariffs, where the 
weights are the import shares o f the commodities in question. The table gives a good idea of 
which sectors still had high levels o f protection prior to CAFTA and how that protection is slated 
to change over the next 20 years. Trade liberalization in the 1990s reduced protection in all 
manufacturing sectors other than textiles and processed foods to a low level. Other than textiles, 
all the sectors that had significant tariffs were agricultural, which means that for the most part, 
further trade liberalization under CAFTA will primarily affect agriculture. Tariffs go to zero in all 
sectors by year 20, but the process is not uniform. As we saw in Table 3, liberalization for 
subsistence commodities does not begin until almost 10 years after ratification. Protection drops 
rapidly for textiles and bananas, but since these are both export sectors, it is not clear how 
important this change in protection really is.
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Table 4
CHANGING TARIFF RATES OVER TIME BY SECTOR TARIFF CATEGORIES UNDER CAFTA
Category
A Immediate tariff reduction to zero
B Linear reduction of tariffs to zero over five years
C Linear reduction of tariffs over ten years.
D Linear reduction of tariffs over fifteen years
E Six Year grace period, then reduction of 33% over next four years, then full liberalization from 12th to 15th year.
F Ten year grace period, then linear reduction to zero over the next ten years.
G Goods in this category already have zero tariff rate
H Goods in this category are excluded from tariff reductions under CAFTA, with tariffs remaining at the rates 
agreed to in WTO.
M Non-linear reduction in tariffs to zero. 2% in 1st year, 8% per year from 3rd to 6th year and 16% per year from 
7th to 10th year.
N Elimination of tariffs in 12 equal annual steps.
O Six year grace period and then elimination in nine non-linear steps, 40% from 7th to 11th year and 60% from 
12th to 15th year.




III. MODELING THE IMPACT OF CAFTA ON EMPLOYMENT AND PRODUCTION
To predict the impact o f CAFTA on the Honduran economy, we use a recursive dynamic general 
equilibrium model, in order to incorporate the general equilibrium effects o f the changes 
introduced by CAFTA on prices, output, and employment across different sectors o f the 
economy. As we have already seen, trade liberalization under CAFTA is mainly limited to tariff 
reductions in various agricultural commodities. Those changes will obviously affect prices, 
output, and employment in agriculture. But they will also have indirect effects on urban 
consumers, government revenue, prices, the balance o f payments, and the exchange rate, which 
well may be larger than the direct effect o f the tariff reductions in agriculture as well as second- 
round effects. In this chapter, we give a short overview o f the model, with a complete 
mathematical and technical discussion relegated to the appendixes 1 to 4.
1. The recursive dynamic CGE model
Recursive dynamic CGE models 5 have been used in Chenery, Robinson, and Syrquin (1999) and 
El-Said, Lofgren and Robinson (2001) to analyze development strategies in Korea and Egypt, 
respectively; in Lofgren, Harris and Robinson (2001) as a tool to model changes in poverty 
resulting from various policy alternatives; and finally in Thurlow (2003), who developed a 
recursive dynamic model for South Africa.
These models are solved in two stages. In the first stage, a solution is sought for a one- 
year equilibrium using a static CGE model (see Lofgren, Harris and Robinson. 2001). In the 
second stage, a model between periods is used to handle the dynamic linkages that update the 
variables that drive growth. The intertemporal equations provide all exogenous variables needed 
for the next period by the CGE model, which is then solved for a new equilibrium. The model is 
solved forward in a dynamically recursive fashion, with each static solution depending only on 
current and past variables. The model does not incorporate future expectations; instead the 
behavior o f its agents is based on adaptive expectations, as the model is solved one period at a 
time. The variables and parameters used as linkages between periods are the aggregate capital 
stock (which is updated endogenously, given previous investment and depreciation), the 
population, the domestic labor force, factor productivity, export and import prices, export 
demand, tariff rates, and transfers to and from the rest o f the world, all o f which are modified 
exogenously. The dynamic model used in this research follows the models developed by the 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). 6
This model for Honduras is solved for 1997 (the base year for the data) and then solved 
recursively year by year until the year 2020. This allows us to compare growth trajectories under 
different policy scenarios and to track changes in policies such as tariff levels, which change 
slowly over time. Most CGE trade models are solved for just the final comparative static
This section of the paper is taken from Piñeiro (2006).
6 See Lofgren, Harris and Robinson (2001) and Thurlow (2003).
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equilibrium changes resulting from a change in tariffs. Under CAFTA, however, the tariff 
changes are gradual to give affected sectors the time to make adjustments, so tracking the timing 
of impacts o f the changes is an important part o f the analysis.
2. First step: The single-period solution
Basic data for CGE models are obtained from a social accounting matrix (SAM). A SAM is a 
comprehensive, economy-wide data framework, typically representing the economy o f a country. 
The SAM used in this paper is for 1997 and is based on the SAM developed by Jose Cuesta and 
reported in Cuesta (2005).
The CGE model has three components. The first shows the payments that are registered in 
the SAM, following the same disaggregation o f factors, activities, commodities, and institutions 
shown in the matrix. The second is the equations that represent the behavior o f the different 
institutions present. The third is the system o f constraints that have to be satisfied by the whole 
system, including the factor and goods markets, the balances for savings-investment, the 
government, and the current account o f the rest o f the world.
Each producer maximizes profits under constant returns to scale and perfect competition. 
There are two factors o f production: labor (differentiated by skill) and capital. Production is 
related to factor inputs in a constant elasticity o f substitution (CES) production function, which 
allows the producers to substitute these two inputs until they reach the point where the marginal 
revenue o f each factor equals the factor price (wage or rent). The second choice the producers 
make is the amount o f intermediate inputs they will use. This specification is made assuming 
fixed shares that specify the appropriate amount o f intermediate inputs per unit o f output and 
labor or capital (value added). Finally, output prices depend on the value added (cost o f labor and 
capital), intermediate inputs, and any relevant taxes and subsidies.
Figure 1 shows the flow o f a single commodity from producers to final demand. First, 
goods from all producers are aggregated into commodity outputs using a CES product demand 
system. The aggregate output is sold domestically or internationally. The producers’ allocation 
between domestic sales and exports is specified via a constant elasticity o f transformation (CET) 
function, assuming imperfect transformability between exports and domestic sales. The producers 
will sell their products to the market with the highest profitability. The domestic price is the 
international price times the exchange rate, plus any possible export taxes or export subsidies. 
The domestic good is combined with imports to produce the composite commodity. For this the 
Armington (1969) specification is used, which means that the domestically produced and 
imported goods are imperfect substitutes.
In this model, there are four institutions: households, enterprises, government, and the rest 
of the world, which do three things: produce, consume, and accumulate capital. Households save 
a constant coefficient o f their disposable income and buy consumption goods. They own the 
enterprises and they work in them. As a result, household income is the sum of salaries, profits, 
government transfers, and rest o f the world transfers. Household consumption o f goods and 
services is determined by a linear expenditure system (LES). Firms buy intermediate goods, hire 
factors o f production, produce commodities and services, and sell them in the market.
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Government receives taxes, consumes goods and services, and makes transfers to households. 
The capital account collects the savings from the households, firms, government, and the rest of 
the world and buys capital goods (investment).
Figure 1
FLOW OF GOODS FROM PRODUCERS TO THE NATIONAL COMPOSITE COMMODITY
3. Closures and assumptions on factor supplies
The closures are the mechanisms that determine how various macro constraints are satisfied. 
(1) Honduras has a flexible exchange rate, which means that foreign savings are fixed. (2) For the 
government, the level o f consumption and income taxes are fixed across simulations. (3) In 
equilibrium, total saving must equal total investment. There are various ways to guarantee this. In 
all but one o f our simulations, we fix the saving rates o f households and government, which 
relates total saving and investment positively to the level o f income. (4) In the labor markets, we 
assume that there is an excess supply o f unskilled and semi-skilled labor and a fixed real wage 
rate. We also assume that within each period labor is mobile across sectors, which means that real 
wages are equal across sectors for these two types o f labor. For skilled labor, a supply curve is 
added, making wages as well as quantities endogenous to the model. (5) Capital is fully 
employed and sector specific, which means that profit rates are free to vary across sectors.
4. Second step: Between periods
In the second step o f the recursive model, the linkages between periods are introduced. To do 
this, we solve the static model for one specific year and then update the capital stock, population, 
domestic labor force, factor productivity, export and import prices, and export demand 
parameters. The updated model is then solved again for the following year and so on. Total 
capital accumulation is endogenous (in all but the foreign direct investment [FDI] scenario) since 
it is equal to total saving, which is endogenous. By definition, it is equal to the last period’s
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capital stock plus total investment minus depreciation. 7 The allocation o f new capital across 
sectors is done by adjusting the proportion o f each sector’s share in aggregate investment as a 
function o f the relative profit rate o f each sector, compared with the average profit rate o f the 
economy as a whole. Sectors with higher (lower) average profit rates will get higher (lower) 
shares o f the available investment. Over time sector profit rates should converge.
The reader should note that our version o f dynamic behavior may well understate or 
overstate the full reaction o f an economy to changes in policies or conditions. In the model, total 
investment is determined by total saving and is therefore endogenous. But neither the saving nor 
the investment decision is modeled directly. Thus we do not incorporate the possible effect on 
total capital formation of a rise in the overall profit rate in response to CAFTA, for example, or a 
rise in total saving in response to a rise in the interest rate. This limited characteristic o f our 
version o f the dynamic reaction to changes in CAFTA should be kept in mind in interpreting the 
results.
Turning to the supply o f labor by skill, the model determines only the amount of 
employment. It does not distinguish between those who are unemployed and those o f working 
age who are not in the labor force. This is an important distinction for skilled labor. For unskilled 
labor, we assume that there will be an excess supply o f labor up to 2020, which is equivalent to 
assuming that the rate o f growth o f employment does not exhaust the available stock o f either 
unemployed or inactive unskilled labor.
For skilled labor, we assume an upward sloping supply curve with an elasticity o f +5 with 
respect to the real wage, shifting rightward by 2 percent per year. In addition to unemployment, 
Honduras has a large pool o f well-educated but inactive labor, especially among women. We 
assume that the growth in this group will be high enough up to 2020 to supply the amount of 
skilled labor called for in our sequence o f short-run solutions. This assumption may be unrealistic 
in the FDI scenario because it requires a rapid growth rate o f employment.
Finally, productivity growth, real government consumption and transfers, world price of 
exports, and current account balances are set exogenously based on observed trends.
For investment, we have two different treatments depending on the simulation. In the 
CAFTA simulations related to tariff reductions, changes in the maquila scheme, and import 
quotas, we use a savings-driven closure in the single period solution. In the FDI simulation, we 
impose as a constraint that all additions to FDI must be devoted to fixed investment. Therefore, in 
this simulation, total saving is investment driven.
To estimate the capital stock in the base period 1997, we assume a lifetime of 12 years for 
capital where all the depreciation occurs in the final year. With this assumption, the estimate of the capital 
stock in 1997 is completely independent of the assumed initial capital output ratio and depends only on the 
level of investment observed between 1984 and 1996. The initial level of capital turns out to be 2.26 times 
the level of GDP at market prices. In the dynamic simulations, we set depreciation in year t at 8 percent of 
the capital stock, so that the transition equations at time t depend only on the solution at time t-1.
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To summarize, the dynamic accumulation process is updated in three ways:
a) By exogenous trends (labor force growth, productivity changes, capital stock
growth, and population growth);
b) By economic behavior (distribution o f  investment by sector and distribution o f
labor force by sector and category); and
c) By implemented policies (changes in tariffs, import quotas, and FDI as a result o f
the implementation o f CAFTA.
For the resulting dynamic model, we first do a forward simulation to 2020 to create what 
we call a base run, in which there are no CAFTA-related changes in exogenous variables. 8 We 
then run the model with various CAFTA policy alternatives and compare those results with the 
base run. Because we may not have completely captured important aspects o f dynamic behavior 
or because o f misspecifications in the model itself, we put less weight on the absolute values o f  
our projects than we do on the comparison o f the base run with the various CAFTA alternatives. 
In other words, we are less confident o f the growth or employment forecasts o f our base run or 
CAFTA alternatives than we are o f the differences between them.
8 For this exercise, we modified the transfers from the enterprises to the rest of the world in 
such a way that they were eliminated by the year 2005 in all the scenarios including the “base.”
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IV. THE CAFTA SIMULATIONS
The dynamic model described in the previous section is recursive. It solves the system of 
equations for all the endogenous variables for each period and then updates variables either 
because they are endogenous in the model or because they are policy variables such as tariffs that 
change over time. In each of the simulations, we run the model from its 1997 base, using the 
observed values for all exogenous variables up to 2005, and then insert the changes introduced by 
CAFTA in 2005 and beyond. We run each simulation out to 2020 and present the results in the 
form of growth rates o f all the endogenous variables o f interest from the 1997 initial values. Each 
table displays the initial values for each variable and the annual average growth rate from 1997 to 
2020. There are five simulations.
Base: This is the projection o f the economy without CAFTA. It is our best estimate of 
how the economy would grow in the absence o f CAFTA, and therefore it is the counterfactual 
against which each o f the CAFTA simulations should be compared.
Tariffcut1: In this simulation, we change all the sectoral tariffs according to the time 
patterns shown in Table 4. Since these tariff changes vary across both time and sector, it is useful 
to show explicitly the time path o f the response to the changes, rather than just the 23-year 
average rate o f growth.
Maquila: Textiles are an area o f potentially large benefits but equally large and uncertain 
risks because o f the expiration o f the Multifiber Agreement in January 2005. In the past, (before 
2000) in Central America maquila was almost entirely limited to the assembly o f clothing from 
imported inputs. Since 1984, when the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act was passed, the 
maquila industry has been exempt from the worldwide quota system then in force. But its 
products were not exempt from U.S. tariffs until the U.S. Congress passed the Caribbean Basin 
Economic Recovery Expansion Act in 1990. With the passage o f the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994, this advantage was partially offset by the more generous treatment 
of Mexican producers with regard to rules o f origin. The Caribbean Trade Promotion Act 
(CBTPA), passed in 2000, extended to the Central American countries the market access 
conditions for maquila granted to Mexico under NAFTA, with similar liberalized restrictions on 
rules o f origin. Imports o f knitted or shaped apparel were permitted into the United States free of 
tariffs, provided the intermediate inputs from the yarn up to the final good were produced in a 
CAFTA country. 9 This has had a major impact on production in Central America. But the 
CBTPA has a sunset provision. It will expire in 2008 unless CAFTA is implemented. What 
CAFTA does for textiles is to make permanent the liberalized rules o f origin for inputs to the 
maquila industry granted temporarily under the CBTPA. To model the impact o f these provisions 
of the CAFTA agreement, we keep the level o f intermediate imports to the textile industry at the 
observed level o f 1997 prior to the passage o f the CBTPA. Then starting in 2005, we reduce 
these intermediate imports to the very low levels observed after 2000. This simulation then shows
Tee shirts and socks were subject to a maximum tariff-free import ceiling.
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the positive effect o f domestically producing a greater share o f the intermediate inputs to the 
booming maquila industry.
Quotas: For imports into Honduras, certain commodities o f particular importance to the 
poor, either as consumers or producers, are given special treatment under CAFTA. Tariffs for 
these commodities were typically quite high prior to CAFTA, and the rate o f tariff reduction 
under CAFTA in most cases will be slow, as shown in Table 3. But CAFTA also established 
TRQs in many o f these commodities, making liberalization faster than is apparent from the tariff 
category in which these commodities were placed. These are the commodities for which CAFTA 
could have a significant effect in the short run, since CAFTA will permit tariff-free imports up to 
certain quantitative limits as soon as the treaty is implemented (or in the case o f chicken legs, in 
year three). In addition, the United States granted tariff-free importation for quantities o f certain 
commodities specifically from Honduras. We now look at the most important o f these 
commodities and ask what the impact o f the TRQs is likely to be in practice.
What is the effect o f the Honduran quota on domestic prices and producers? It is easy to 
show that quotas only have an effect on domestic prices and output levels if  they are larger than 
the amount previously imported (see Morley 2006). If they are smaller, they are effectively a 
transfer o f tariff revenue to the importer. In the Honduras case, yellow corn is the only product 
where the initial quota is bigger than the level o f imports. But no yellow corn is produced in 
Honduras. For pork and chicken legs, the quota is approximately equal to the level o f imports, 
but both are quite small relative to the level o f production, which means that if  there is a price 
effect it must be small. Therefore, in the quota simulation, we assume that these quotas have no 
effect on the domestic price o f imports.
The other possible impact o f the quota component o f CAFTA is the favorable effect of 
liberalized quotas in the United States for certain Honduran exports. As in the import case, 
expanded quotas in the United States only affect the domestic price and production in Honduras 
for products for which the CAFTA quotas are larger than the current level o f exports. That is the 
case for sugar, beef, and some dairy products. The value o f the additional quota is equal to the 
U.S. tariff times the international price times the quantity o f imports permitted into the U.S. 
market tariff-free. In addition, when the market-clearing domestic price o f these commodities 
changes, the size o f the change depends on the size o f the liberalized quota, compared with the 
initial level o f production. In fact, when we make this comparison, we find that the change in the 
domestic price o f these commodities is virtually zero. 10 We have therefore not reported 
simulations for the quota changes in the sections that follow.
Foreign direct investment (FDI): It is relatively straightforward to model the impact o f  
trade liberalization under CAFTA. But there are many additional items and agreements under 
CAFTA that have to do with the treatment o f FDI. All are aimed at defining and protecting the 
rights o f foreign investors with respect to the protection o f intellectual property and 
expropriation. Many observers see these conditions as excessively generous to foreign investors. 
It is beyond the scope o f this paper to make a complete analysis o f the net benefits or costs o f  
these FDI provisions to the Honduran economy. Since no one has a very clear idea o f just how 
much additional FDI Honduras can expect to receive under the new CAFTA legal conditions, as
10 See Morley (2006) for details.
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a first approximation, we simply increase by 25 percent the level o f FDI that came into Honduras 
between 2000 and 2004 and keep that increase the same all the way to 2020. This gives rise to 
two effects. The first and less important one is the simple effect on balance o f payments o f an 
increased inflow o f foreign resources. The second and more important effect is on total capital 
formation. These inflows go to capital formation. Therefore, in this simulation, we change our 
saving-investment closure to ensure that these inflows directly increase investment.
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V. RESULTS OF THE CGE SIMULATIONS
Our model projects that without CAFTA the Honduran economy would grow at a relatively slow  
rate o f 3.1 percent per year from its 1997 base up to 2020, or at a slightly lower rate between 
2005 and 2020 because o f the large increases in the level o f transfers between 1997 and 2005. 
The model reproduces quite well both the observed growth rate and fluctuations in it between 
1997 and 2005, which gives us some confidence in the simulations o f the effects o f CAFTA. This 
low rate reflects three things: first, the relatively low rate o f investment in the base year; second, 
the low rate o f growth o f observed productivity in the recent past; and third, the treatment of 
maquila. We assume no growth in productivity in any o f the runs reported here. Lifting that 
assumption has little effect on the comparisons between the base run and the CAFTA 
alternatives.
Maquila requires further comment. One usually simulates the effect o f a change from 
current conditions. The maquila case is different, however, because the favorable treatment for 
inputs to maquila started in 2000 but would have expired in 2008 in the absence o f CAFTA. The 
baseline simulation is our best forecast o f what the growth rate would be without maquila, while 
the maquila simulation forecasts growth if  temporary benefits to maquila were made permanent. 
Without maquila, growth in Honduras is predicted to fall to 3.1 percent per year, whereas the 
growth rate jumps to 4.5 percent with the conversion o f the benefits for maquila from temporary 
to permanent (Table 5).
Table 5
RATES OF GROWTH OF MACROECONOMIC AGGREGATES IN CAFTA SIMULATIONS
Initial value Annual percentage growth rate (1997-2020)
1997 a/ Base CAFTA Maquila Quotas All CAFTA FDI b/
Absorption 74.10 3.35 3.47 4.62 3.35 4.72 5.35
Private consumption 50.80 3.33 3.44 4.73 3.34 4.82 5.24
Fixed Investment 15.87 3.67 3.81 4.69 3.67 4.81 6.84
Government
consumption 5.42 3.42 3.58 4.39 3.43 4.54
Exports 28.06 2.40 2.64 3.40 2.40 3.60 5.04
Imports 32.00 3.22 3.40 3.98 3.23 4.13 5.29
GDP (market price) 70.17 3.06 3.19 4.46 3.06 4.57 5.26
Source: Authors’ worksheets. 
a/ In 1997 billion of lempiras. 
b/ FDI is foreign direct investment.
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In Figure 2, we show various projections o f real GDP at market prices, starting in year 
2000. The dashed line is the baseline showing our estimate o f how Honduras will grow in the 
absence o f CAFTA. The remaining lines show the effect o f the CAFTA tariff cuts, the 
liberalization o f rules o f imports for maquila, and an increase in FDI. 11 Other than FDI and 
maquila, each o f these effects is positive, but none o f them is large, particularly tariff cuts and 
quotas. The tariff cuts, for example, while positive, add less than 0.02 percent to the overall 
growth rate. Higher tariff-free quotas for sugar, beef, and dairy in the United States are like a 
small foreign exchange windfall to the economy. While that windfall is positive, it also tends to 
cause the exchange rate to appreciate, discouraging exports and encouraging imports, both of 
which reduce the net positive impact o f the quotas themselves.
Figure 2
PROJECTIONS OF REAL GDP, 1997-2020
1997 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
-  -  -  B A S E LIN E -------------- TARCUT1  * ------MAQUILA -------• ------ALLCAFTA ---------------FDI
Source: Authors’ worksheets.
These results confirm what we should have expected. Past trade liberalization in 
Honduras reduced average tariffs to a level where the further reductions resulting from the 
CAFTA agreement simply are not large enough on average to have much o f an impact. On 
sensitive products such as corn, beans, and rice, either the tariff reductions permitted by CAFTA 
are not large, or they are spread out over a long period. In either case, the net effect on the overall 
growth rate is small. This does not necessarily mean that the effect on particular sectors is not 
large.
11 We do not show the quota line on the graph because the effect is so small that the line is 
indistinguishable from the baseline projection.
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Table 5 shows the rates o f growth o f the main macroeconomic aggregates in the different 
simulations, assuming that government saving is fixed and that productivity growth continues to 
be zero. 12 The last column on the right shows the combined effect o f all o f the changes other 
than FDI, while each o f the other columns shows the separate effect o f each o f the changes. The 
table confirms what is implied in Figure 2. Tariff reductions and liberalization o f quotas both 
have positive effects on growth, but the effects are very small. Trade liberalization does make the 
Honduran economy more open, increasing the rates o f growth o f both exports and imports, but 
the positive effect on the growth rate o f GDP is small.
In contrast, the liberalized rules o f origin for maquila do have a significant impact on the 
growth rate o f the economy. CAFTA makes permanent the CBTPA rules o f origin for the 
intermediate inputs for many lines o f textile exports to the United States. In the simulation, we 
make permanent the sharp reductions in imported inputs to the maquila sector that were observed 
in Honduras after 2000 when the CBTPA went into effect. This alone raises the level o f output in 
2020 by about 38 percent relative to what it would have been in the baseline simulation. Maquila 
alone brings the growth rate up from 3.06 to 4.5 percent per year. Comparing the ALLCAFTA 
column in the table with the maquila column, we see that virtually the entire positive impact of 
CAFTA on the growth rate is due to maquila.
Several other growth patterns should be noted. First the rate o f growth o f domestic 
spending or absorption exceeds the growth rate o f production in all the simulations, which 
implies that an increasing share o f domestic spending is supplied by imports in the base line and 
in all the CAFTA simulations Since the rate o f growth o f exports is less than the growth rate of 
the economy, this implies an increase in the trade deficit. This pattern is misleading. In the base 
year 1997, there was a large negative transfer from Honduras enterprises to the rest o f the world. 
This transfer was eliminated by 2005. In our simulation, we adjust the transfer account so that it 
follows the observed balance-of-payments data. That means that there is a large positive change 
in the transfer account, permitting a rapid increase in imports and a decline in exports up to 2005. 
After 2005, the trade deficit is assumed to be fixed in real terms. Since real income is rising, the 
trade deficit as a fraction o f total income is falling. Using a 2005 base, exports grow at 4 percent 
and imports grow at only 2.6 percent in the base simulation. In fact, the rate o f growth o f exports 
exceeds that o f both the economy and the rate o f growth o f imports after 2005 in all the 
simulations.
1. The impact of CAFTA on sectoral growth rates
The sectoral growth rates o f trade and domestic production in Table 6 show that trade 
liberalization under CAFTA increases exports, imports, and production in both the primary and 
secondary sectors. The effects are all small but positive. Thus, despite the fears o f some that the
12 We also ran a set of simulations where we dropped the assumption of fixed government 
saving. This change had little impact on the results, which means that even though the loss of government 
revenue from tariffs is significant in an accounting sense, whether or not that loss is offset by an increase 
in other taxes or a higher government deficit makes little difference in the overall growth rate or the 
sectoral composition of output.
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rise in imports due to falling trade barriers would more than offset any expansion in exports, our 
results suggest that this will not happen.
The sectoral effects o f maquila are more complex. Liberalized rules o f origin on 
intermediate inputs in maquila cause a big reduction in imports to the textile industry. On 
balance, one might expect the exchange rate to appreciate, causing exports to fall and imports to 
rise enough to offset the reduction in textile imports. But that is not what happens. Instead, there 
is a significant increase in national production, employment, and demand, which is large enough 
to require a depreciation o f the exchange rate to induce more exports and choke off some o f the
13demand for imports. Effectively, the economy becomes slightly more closed by import 
substitution in the textile industry, and the resulting rise in employment increases demand and 
output in all other sectors.
Table 6
NATIONAL PRODUCTION AND TRADE
Initial Annual percentage growth rate (1997-2020)
share 
1997 a/ Base CAFTA Maquila Quotas All CAFTA FDI
Exports 100.00
Agricultural sector 26.53 1.96 2.23 2.64 1.96 2.86 5.01
Primary sector 29.18 1.97 2.26 2.63 1.97 2.86 5.01
Minery 2.65 2.08 2.54 2.55 2.08 2.91 5.09
Secondary sector 47.91 2.60 2.86 3.76 2.60 3.98 5.24
Manufacturing sector 47.85 2.60 2.86 3.76 2.60 3.98 5.24
Food industry 25.74 2.88 3.09 4.27 2.88 4.45 5.47
Imports 100.00
Agricultural sector 9.59 3.39 3.65 4.66 3.39 4.91 5.45
Primary sector 20.22 3.16 3.40 4.28 3.16 4.50 5.43
Minery 10.62 2.94 3.16 3.91 2.94 4.11 5.42
Secondary sector 39.68 3.23 3.45 3.44 3.24 3.62 5.35
Manufacturing sector 39.44 3.23 3.44 3.43 3.24 3.61 5.35
Food industry 0.00 3.57 3.64 4.64 3.58 4.71 5.61
Production 100.00
Agricultural sector 43.18 3.26 3.37 4.57 3.26 4.66 5.39
Primary sector 43.21 3.26 3.37 4.57 3.26 4.66 5.39
Minery 0.03 2.29 2.59 2.90 2.29 3.10 5.17
Secondary sector 19.72 3.08 3.24 4.21 3.08 4.35 5.39
Manufacturing sector 13.19 2.88 3.05 4.04 2.88 4.18 5.23
Food industry 4.88 3.14 3.30 4.43 3.14 4.57 5.51
Source: Authors’ worksheets.
a/ Initial share of total exports, imports and production respectively.
13 The import share rises from 40.7 percent in 2005 to 47.4 percent in 2020, and exports grow 
by 5.3 percent per year after 2005.
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In Table 7 we show the effects o f the different CAFTA simulations on production for all 
of the disaggregated sectors included in the CGE model. The full details o f exports and imports 
by sector in the different experiments are relegated to Appendix 1, Table A1. Table 7 helps us to 
understand why the Honduran economy is relatively insensitive to CAFTA. Consider agriculture, 
CAFTA has a positive impact on exports and production o f coffee, and bananas, but it has 
virtually no effect on the subsistence part o f agriculture (that is, the production o f corn, beans, 
rice, and other commodities produced by the poor). Since this subsistence sector comprises over 
80 percent o f total agricultural production in Honduras, agriculture as a whole is insensitive to 
CAFTA. Similarly, maquila has a large positive effect on textiles, but at the base level, production 
in textiles is not large enough to give the entire manufacturing sector a big push forward.
The fact that the tariff reductions and TRQs granted by Honduras under CAFTA do not 
cause significant price reductions in the short run does not mean that domestic producers will be 
unaffected by the agreement in the long run. In the long run, the level o f protection for many 
important commodities will be eliminated. But the tariff reductions are gradual, which will give 
farmers time to adjust and to become more competitive. What will be critical from a policy 
perspective is that this time is used wisely to increase productivity, switch to more profitable 
crops, and take advantage o f the new export opportunities opened up by CAFTA.
Table 7
PRODUCTION AND ANNUAL PERCENTAGE GROWTH RATES
Annual percentage growth rate
Sector 1997 shr Baseline CAFTA Maquila Quotas All CAFTA FDI
Banana 0.71 1.30 1.72 1.77 1.30 2.13 4.59
Coffee 1.20 2.23 2.51 2.97 2.23 3.21 6.83
Mining 0.03 2.29 2.59 2.90 2.29 3.10 6.02
Livestock 0.91 3.21 3.35 4.74 3.22 4.84 6.39
Non-trad. Ag. 6.94 2.81 2.93 3.86 2.81 3.95 6.15
Subsist. Ag. 33.44 3.41 3.52 4.79 3.41 4.88 6.41
Food 4.88 3.14 3.30 4.43 3.14 4.57 6.51
Textiles 2.13 2.96 3.08 4.51 2.97 4.61 6.23
Paper 1.33 2.51 2.65 3.31 2.52 3.42 6.03
Chemicals 1.83 2.63 2.78 3.58 2.63 3.69 5.41
Metals 1.14 2.99 3.12 3.95 2.99 4.05 6.23
Other mfg 1.88 2.50 2.85 3.33 2.50 3.63 5.95
Elec, water 1.72 2.93 3.10 4.09 2.93 4.23 6.1
Construction 4.81 3.63 3.78 4.68 3.63 4.81 7.09
Commerce 14.10 3.00 3.15 4.01 3.00 4.14 6.61
Hotels 2.94 2.76 2.92 4.57 2.77 4.67 5.94
Transport 4.53 2.94 3.15 3.76 2.94 3.93 6.64
Finance 3.08 2.87 3.00 3.76 2.87 3.87 6.02
Personal svc 1.19 3.01 3.14 3.97 3.01 4.09 6.15
Government 4.77 2.97 3.07 3.71 2.97 3.79 6.32




One o f the main purposes o f the CAFTA agreement is to attract more FDI to Central America by 
reducing or eliminating the risk o f expropriation, or other unfavorable actions by national 
governments that specifically target foreign enterprises. These components o f the agreement have 
elicited a good deal o f unfavorable comment within Latin America because they appear to 
infringe on the sovereignty o f host-country governments. Our purpose here is not to enter into 
this dispute but rather to make a rough estimate o f the effects on the economy o f these 
components o f the agreement, assuming that they in fact succeed in attracting more FDI. This 
exercise is somewhat different from what we have done so far, because we have no observable 
econometric basis on which to make an estimate o f the response o f foreign investors to the new 
CAFTA incentives for FDI. In our FDI simulation, we assume an increase o f 25 percent over the 
observed capital transfers to Honduras between 2000 and 2004. Furthermore, we make all o f this 
increased FDI a net addition to domestic capital formation. In other words, here the saving- 
investment closure is investment driven.
Consider now what the FDI simulation tells us about the effect of additional inflows of 
FDI. Compare the FDI column in each o f the Tables 5-7 with the base simulation. By 
assumption, we are both increasing total saving and forcing more o f it into investment. As a 
result the share o f investment in GDP in 2020 rises to 31.9 percent, compared with only 25.9 
percent in the base run. That additional capital coupled with the additional employment it induces 
leads to dramatic increases in production in all sectors. Overall the growth rate o f the economy 
jumps from 3.0 to 5.3 percent (see Figure 2 ). Instead o f growing by 4.0 percent per year between 
2005 and 2020, exports now grow at twice that rate (7.9 percent).
No one should take these results as a firm prediction o f the likely effects o f CAFTA on 
either FDI or growth. Rather it is a way o f emphasizing the central importance o f investment to 
future growth in Honduras under CAFTA. If the more favorable treatment o f FDI really does 
bring in more foreign capital, and if  that foreign capital is invested in new capital, this will have a 
dramatic positive effect on the development prospects o f the Honduran economy.
3. CAFTA and domestic factor markets
Consider next the impact o f CAFTA on wages, employment, and the rate o f return to capital. The 
available data permit us to disaggregate labor by education, gender, and type o f employment 
(wage versus self-employment). Unfortunately, they do not permit a rural-urban breakdown. 14 
We have assumed that there is an excess supply o f labor, both male and female with less than 10 
years o f education. That implies that the base-period level o f real wages for these types o f labor is 
fixed. The simulations then determine the amount o f employment o f unskilled or semi-skilled 
labor that is consistent with the supply o f skilled labor and capital as well as the other macro 
constraints.
2. Foreign direct investment
14 In a later paper, we will combine information from a recent household survey with the results 
reported here to get an estimate of the impact of CAFTA on rural and urban incomes.
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The changes in employment o f unskilled and semi-skilled labor by gender and labor type 
in the different simulations are presented in Table 8, while Table 9 shows what happens to 
relative wages. The numbers in the table 8 are units o f employment normalized by total payments 
to each category o f labor in the base year.
Unskilled and semi-skilled labor in Honduras is concentrated in self-employment in small 
farms in the countryside and in the informal sector in the cities and towns. In the baseline 
simulation, employment growth is slightly higher than the growth rate o f the population (3.0 
percent for male wage labor, 3.3 percent for male self-employed, and slightly less for females in 
each category. It is assumed that there is an excess supply o f unskilled labor willing to work at 
the constant real wage. Under those conditions the increase in the supply o f capital permits a 
relatively rapid increase in the employment o f the unskilled, particularly in the FDI simulation. In 
all the simulations, the growth rate o f employment is higher than the expected rate o f growth in 
the supply o f unskilled labor, which implies that in the absence o f CAFTA or some other policy 
change, the pool o f unemployed unskilled labor should fall in Honduras.
Trade liberalization by itself (TARCUT1 column) has a positive effect, but the total 
impact is small. That is consistent with the relatively small size o f the production impacts under 
CAFTA. As before, what does make a difference is maquila. By 2020, maquila will create an 
additional 22 million units o f employment for males and 4.3 million units for women, raising the 
growth o f employment for both sexes to about 4.5 percent. Increased FDI also has a significant 
positive effect for male wage labor. That is because o f the strong link between investment and the 
construction sector, which is a large employer o f unskilled wage labor.
When one compares wage trajectories or wage differentials by skill category, the results 
suggest that there will be a slight rise in earnings inequality, with or without CAFTA (Table 9). 
The supply curve o f skilled labor is projected to rise by 2 percent per year, somewhat less than 
the increase in the demand for skilled labor. As a result, real wages for the skilled rise in all o f the 
simulations, including the baseline. 15 Since wages for the unskilled and semi-skilled are fixed by 
the assumption o f an excess supply o f labor, there is a decline in the relative wage o f the 
unskilled. In the baseline projection, by 2020 the unskilled lose 12 percent in wages relative to 
the skilled. Trade liberalization makes the wage pyramid for the employed slightly less equal. 
That is because it increases the growth rate o f employment o f the unskilled and the wages o f the 
skilled. CAFTA increases the earnings o f both the skilled and the unskilled, but for the latter the 
improvements come in the form of more jobs at the same wage, while for the former the 
improvement comes in the form of higher wages only.
The maquila and FDI simulations accentuate this picture. Both o f them increase the 
growth rate o f the economy by a significant amount, and as we can see, the faster the economy 
grows, the faster wages o f the skilled grow relative to the unskilled. That increases the inequality 
of earnings. But at the same time there is a higher rate o f growth o f employment for the unskilled
15 For the maquila and FDI simulations, we assume that the rate of growth of working-age 
skilled labor is 2.5 percent per year after 2010 to reflect increases in school attendance and higher levels of 
education in younger age cohorts. This makes the participation and unemployment rates consistent with 
the higher rates of growth of employment called for in these two simulations.
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and semi-skilled o f both sexes. The unskilled are better off because more o f them have jobs, and 
the skilled are better off because all o f them have higher real wages.
Table 8
EMPLOYMENT BY SKILL AND GENDER
Male unskilled and semiskilled wage labor
Baseline Tarcut1 Maquila Quota All CAFTA FDI
Initial 7 127 7 127 7 127 7 127 7 127 7 127
2000 7 711 7 711 7 711 7 711 7 711 7 852
2005 9 007 9 151 10 318 9.01 10 432 10 134
2010 10 423 10 682 12 592 10 427 12 831 13 707
2015 12 095 12 527 15 372 12 102 15 807 18.21
2020 13 925 14 551 18 612 13 935 19 293 23 399
Self-employment of unskilled and semi-skilled male labor
Initial 25 624 25 624 25 624 25 624 25 624 25 624
2000 30 165 30 165 30 165 30 165 30 165 28 817
2005 36.87 37 218 43.09 36 889 43 354 37 357
2010 41 838 42 458 51 301 41 862 51 843 50 633
2015 47 771 48 849 61 601 47 807 62 663 67 237
2020 54 213 55 852 73 475 54.26 75 261 86 381
Employment of female unskilled and semi -skilled wage labor
Initial 1 368 1 368 1 368 1 368 1 368 1 368
2000 1 458 1 458 1 458 1 458 1 458 1 461
2005 1 687 1 712 2 036 1 687 2 052 1 866
2010 1 966 2 012 2 535 1 966 2 576 2 585
2015 2 289 2 366 3 132 2.29 3 209 3 449
2020 2 642 2 754 3 834 2 644 3 957 4 453
Self-employment of female unskilled and semi-skilled labor
Initial 3 856 3 856 3 856 3 856 3 856 3 856
2000 4 332 4 332 4 332 4 332 4 332 4 337
2005 5 154 5 232 6 146 5 156 6 204 5 726
2010 5 897 6 035 7 461 5 899 7 591 7 657
2015 6 762 6 989 9 017 6 766 9 252 10 052
2020 7.71 8 034 10 841 7 716 11 207 12 824
Skilled labor-male
Initial 6 148 6 148 6 148 6 148 6 148 6 148
2000 6 482 6 482 6 482 6 482 6 482 6 553
2005 7 429 7 559 8 346 7.43 8 448 8 193
2010 8 629 8 852 10 156 8 632 10 351 11 112
2015 9.97 10 329 12 317 9 975 12 665 14 425
2020 11 399 11 911 14 747 11 406 15.28 18 126
Skilled labor-female
Initial 1 812 1 812 1 812 1 812 1 812 1 812
2000 1 935 1 935 1 935 1 935 1 935 1 933
2005 2 229 2 255 2 502 2.23 2 521 2 436
2010 2.58 2 628 3.04 2.58 3 085 3 319
2015 2 971 3 054 3 664 2 973 3 747 4 322
2020 3.39 3.51 4 371 3 392 4.5 5 447
Source: Authors’ worksheets.
Note: These are normalized units of employment not numbers of jobs.
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The growth o f capital is central to understanding our projections o f the likely effect o f CAFTA 
on the economy. In Table 10, we show how the stock o f capital is expected to grow over time and 
how the gross rate o f return to capital changes in the different scenarios. In the baseline 
simulation, investment starts at 22.6 percent o f GDP and grows to 26 percent by 2020. As a 
result, there is a slight deepening o f capital as well as a slight reduction in the rate o f return. 
Trade liberalization (TARCUT1) slightly raises both the growth rate o f capital and the rate of 
return. However, the time path o f the rate o f return is not linear. In all the simulations it peaks in 
2005. After that, the increased rate o f capital formation drives the rate o f return to capital back 
toward or below its initial level. Maquila has a big impact on the profitability o f capital and its 
growth rate. Upon adoption o f the liberalized rules o f origin, which we first incorporate in the 
model in 2005, the rate o f return to capital jumps from 10 to 15 percent. From 2005 to 2020, the 
rate o f growth o f capital increases to 4.5 percent per year. That is enough to bring the rate of 
return back toward its initial level, but at much higher levels o f employment for the unskilled and 
higher wages for the skilled.
Table 9
4. Capital
RELATIVE REAL WAGES BY SKILL FOR HONDURAS IN THE CGE SCENARIOS
Initial 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
Unskilled women
Baseline 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000
Tarcut1 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000
Maquila 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000
ALLCAFTA 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000
FDI 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000
Skilled women
Baseline 1 000 1 009 1 037 1 070 1 102 1 132
Tarcut1 1 000 1 009 1 040 1 074 1 109 1 141
Maquila 1 000 1 009 1 061 1 104 1 149 1 192
ALLCAFTA 1 000 1 009 1 063 1 109 1 155 1 200
FDI 1 000 1 012 1 060 1 129 1 190 1 246
Unskilled men
Baseline 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000
Tarcut1 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000
Maquila 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000
ALLCAFTA 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000
FDI 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000
Skilled men
Baseline 1 000 1 009 1 037 1 070 1 102 1 132
Tarcut1 1 000 1 009 1 040 1 074 1 109 1 141
Maquila 1 000 1 009 1 061 1 104 1 149 1 192
ALLCAFTA 1 000 1 009 1 063 1 109 1 155 1 200
FDI 1 000 1 009 1 053 1 123 1 183 1 239
Source: Authors’ worksheets.
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The FDI simulation shows what happens when there is a really rapid rate o f capital 
formation. Not only does the rate o f growth o f the economy increase, but the rate o f capital 
deepening increases. Not surprisingly, the rate o f capital formation is so high that it drives down 
the rate o f return to below its level in year 2000.
Table 10
THE SUPPLY AND RETURN TO CAPITAL
Supply of capital
Initial 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
Baseline 158.88 165 951 190 374 229 282 272 740 319 541
Tarcut1 158.88 165 951 190 374 230 238 275 570 325 316
Maquila 158.88 165 951 190 374 240 576 301310 370 903
Allcafta 158.88 165 951 190 374 241 407 304 067 376 942
FDI 158.88 165 951 212 745 320 673 436 536 569 130
Rate of return to capital
Baseline 0.3 0.113 0.118 0.108 0.103 0.099
Tarcut1 0.3 0.113 0.123 0.113 0.108 0.105
Maquila 0.3 0.113 0.159 0.144 0.137 0.133
Allcafta 0.3 0.113 0.163 0.149 0.143 0.138
FDI 0.3 0.122 0.126 0.097 0.092 0.088
Source: Authors’ worksheets.
5. Factor shares
To better understand the distributional implications o f CAFTA, it is useful to look at what 
happens to factor shares in the various experiments. We know that trade liberalization, maquila, 
and FDI all increase the growth rate o f the economy. We know also that the skilled get higher 
wages, capital a higher rate o f return, and the unskilled, more jobs. How does all this translate 
into shares o f GDP? Table 11 gives us the answers. In the baseline simulation, both skilled and 
unskilled labor gain relative to capital for which the fall in the rate o f return exceeds the increase 
in capital intensity. In the short run, CAFTA benefits capital at the expense o f both skilled and 
unskilled labor. In all the simulations in 2005, the capital share rises relative to the baseline, 
especially in maquila and FDI. But that is not the end o f the story. We know that there is a big 
increase in capital formation, too. That drives down the rate o f return in all the simulations, so 
that by 2020 the share o f capital falls from its peak in 2005 and is in fact below its initial level in 
all o f the experiments except maquila. 16 Thus while CAFTA favors capital in the short run, in 
the longer run (to 2020) trade liberalization favors skilled labor at the expense o f capital, while 
maquila favors capital at the expense o f unskilled labor, which tells us that the rate o f growth of 
employment o f the unskilled, even though quite large, is not as rapid as the growth rate o f the 
economy. In FDI, the situation is reversed. Here the decline in the profit rate after 2005 and the
16 Note that the experiment called ALLCAFTA is dominated by maquila.
29
increase in employment are so rapid that both skilled and unskilled labor gain at the expense of 
capital.
Table 11
FACTOR SHARES AS PERCENTAGE OF GDP AT FACTOR COST
Initial 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
Unsk+semiskilled Baseline 0.59 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60
Labor Tarcut1 0.59 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.59
Maquila 0.59 0.60 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58
Quota 0.59 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60
Allcafta 0.59 0.60 0.57 0.58 0.57 0.57
FDI 0.59 0.58 0.56 0.59 0.60 0.60
Skilled labor Baseline 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13
Tarcut1 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.13
Maquila 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12
Quota 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13
Allcafta 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12
FDI 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.14
Capital Baseline 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.27
Tarcut1 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.28
Maquila 0.28 0.29 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.30
Quota 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.27
Allcafta 0.28 0.29 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.30
FDI 0.28 0.31 0.32 0.28 0.27 0.26
Source: Authors’ worksheets.
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VI. CAFTA AND GROWTH DYNAMICS IN HONDURAS
Honduras has been stuck on a slow growth trajectory for many years. The results here suggest that 
CAFTA will not do much to change that unless it leads to a significant increase in capital 
accumulation. The trade liberalization measures contained in the agreement do have a positive effect 
on growth and employment, but the effect is small. As a result of trade liberalization in the 1990s, 
tariff barriers simply are not high enough to have a large impact on growth when they are dismantled.
W hat are these CGE results telling us about growth dynamics and a growth strategy for 
Honduras? In this study, Honduras is treated as an economy constrained by the available supply 
o f skilled labor and capital. The country can obtain higher levels o f output or higher growth rates 
or both by shifting factors o f production to more productive uses, by employing more o f the 
excess potential supply o f unskilled labor, or by raising the rate o f capital accumulation or human 
capital formation. Except for the FDI scenario, we did not change the rate o f capital 
accumulation. Our tariff-cut scenario tells us that the impact o f shifting scarce factors between 
sectors in response to changes in tariffs does not produce much additional growth, either because 
the levels o f protection prior to CAFTA were not large or because the allocation o f capital and 
skilled labor was already close to optimal. In a word, there is not too much to be gained by 
eliminating Harberger triangles.
M aquila is different. It shifts some o f the total supply o f human and physical capital to a 
sector with a relatively high demand for unskilled labor, which increases the growth rate even 
with a constant total supply o f capital. That is because it puts more o f the potential but unused 
supply o f unskilled labor to work. Productivity-enhancing investments in agriculture might well 
do the same thing. Indeed any growth strategy that increases the demand for unskilled labor, 
holding constant the supply o f complementary factors, would increase output and growth.
The FDI scenario reminds us o f how large an impact can be obtained by increasing the 
growth rate o f capital in the economy. If  FDI really does increase in response to CAFTA to the 
degree that we assume in our CAFTA experiment, the impact on the Honduran economy will be 
dramatic. Both economic growth and employment o f the unskilled could double. W hile this is 
undoubtedly an overly optimistic projection, it does point to the critical role o f increasing the rate 
o f capital formation and technical progress in the Honduran economy. From a growth 
perspective, the crucial challenge for Honduras is to create condtions that will attract more 
capital, both domestic and foreign.
CAFTA improves employment prospects for the unskilled. Our simulations assume an 
excess supply o f unskilled labor. In all the CAFTA simulations, job creation is positive, small in 
the case o f trade liberalization but substantial for maquila and FDI. At the same time, since there 
is an increase in the demand for skilled labor, wage inequality increases. Thus CAFTA increases 
the earnings o f both skilled and unskilled labor. The unskilled are better off because more of 
them have jobs, and the skilled are better off because all o f them have higher real wages. W e look 
more closely at the distributional implications o f CAFTA in the next section.
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In the short run, CAFTA benefits capital at the expense o f both skilled and unskilled 
labor. In all the simulations in 2005 the capital share rises relative to the baseline, especially in 
maquila and FD I. But that is not the end o f the story. It turns out that in the longer run, increases 
in capital formation drive down the rate o f return, so that by 2020 the share o f profits in GDP is 
below its initial level in all but the maquila experiments. In the long run trade liberalization 
favors skilled labor at the expense o f capital, while maquila favors capital at the expense of 
unskilled labor. For FDI, the decline in the profit rate after 2005 and the increase in employment 
o f the unskilled is so rapid that both skilled and unskilled labor gain at the expense o f capital.
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VII. THE IMPACT OF CAFTA ON POVERTY AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME
Our dynamic CGE model estimates the effect that CAFTA will have on employment, production, 
and income. W hat implications do those changes have for poverty and the distribution of 
income? To answer those questions we have to find a way to translate the labor market outcomes 
o f the CGE into a distribution o f income across households. That is, the CGE provides 
information about employment creation and wages for individuals, whereas individuals must be 
treated as members o f households for distributional and poverty purposes. Thus if  the CGE tells 
us that a certain number o f additional jobs have been created, we have to decide which formerly 
unemployed individuals will get those jobs and which families they come from. The same 
problem arises if  we are interested in the effect o f a change in the skill composition o f the labor 
force. The CGE solution, for example, may tell us that there is an increase in the share o f the 
labor force that is skilled. W e then need a way o f deciding which members o f which families 
have upgraded their skills.
Following a microsimulation methodology developed by Vos and Paes de Barros, 17 we 
use a household survey as close as possible to the base year o f the CGE to get a base-period 
distribution o f the labor force across the households represented in the survey. First, the labor 
force is divided among the various skills represented in the CGE model, and rates of 
unemployment for each are calculated. Second, random numbers are assigned to the group, which 
will shrink in size, and that group is ranked according to random numbers. For example, if  the 
model calls for an increase in employment, random numbers are assigned to the unemployed. 
Then the procedure moves down the ranked list o f the unemployed until a sufficient number have 
been found to reach the amount o f employment given by the CGE solution. Third, working with 
the newly simulated labor force by type, we repeat the procedure to change the skill or sectoral 
composition o f that labor force. Finally, the wage of the newly composed labor force is changed 
in accordance with the CGE solution. At this point, the new labor force with the new wage 
structure is reassembled into the households from the base-period survey and new levels of 
household income per capita as well as poverty and income distribution statistics are calculated.
Two things about this procedure should be noted. First, the selection o f individuals to be 
moved from one labor category to another is entirely random, not based on any behavioral model. 
This is not entirely satisfactory from a theoretical point o f view. To remedy that defect, the 
procedure is duplicated 50 or 100 times and the statistical results tabulated. That is intended to 
test the validity or sensitivity o f the results to the particular choice o f individuals who are moved 
from a contracting to an expanding group. W e can then report not only the mean o f the various 
trials, but also the standard errors and confidence intervals. In the Honduras case, we repeated 
these simulations 100 times. Second, the solution we are proposing is sequential. That is, we start 
with unemployment, adjusting it to obtain a new labor force determined by the CGE model; then 
we change the sector and skill level o f that new labor force and finally the wage. That seems like 
the right order, but it is possible that the solution would be different if  we had chosen a different 
sequence o f changes.
17 See their description of the method in Vos, Taylor and Paes de Barros (2002).
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For an overview o f the results o f the microsimulations, we show various poverty and distribution 
statistics for the baseline and each o f the four alternate scenarios reported in previous sections of 
this paper (Table 12). Starting from the 2004 base determined by a household survey from that 
year, we do microsimulations for the years 2010, 2015, and 2020, o f which only the first and last 
are reported in the table. The table reports average labor and per capita income, distribution 
statistics, and the three Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (FGT) poverty measures (the poverty index, 
the poverty gap and the severity o f poverty) for both extreme and moderate poverty. The two 
poverty lines are calculated by ECLAC on the basis o f national household surveys, adjusted by 
changes in the cost o f living between 2002 and 2004. 18 Standard errors and confidence intervals 
for the key poverty and distribution statistics for each o f the simulations for year 2020 are 
reported in table 13.
In the baseline scenario, without CAFTA, the model predicts that poverty will fall from 
70 percent in 2004 to 66.4 in 2020, with slightly larger percentage reductions in extreme poverty 
and the poverty gap and slightly larger improvements for the urban poor than for the rural poor 
(Table 12). All o f these changes are significant (Table 13). According to the simulations, per 
capita income is expected to rise by 0.7 percent per year, which implies that poverty elasticity in 
this baseline scenario is only -0.5. Growth does help the poor but not as much as it does in many 
other countries.
Because o f the increase in relative wages for the skilled and the faster rate o f growth in 
the urban sector, there is a slight increase in income inequality. The changes are small and they 
are largely confined to the urban sector.
To consider the effect o f CAFTA on poverty and inequality, we compare the figures for 
2020 for each o f the CAFTA scenarios with those o f the base line for that year. According to the 
model, CAFTA unambiguously helps the poor, both rural and urban— an important result. Tariff 
cuts alone reduce the national poverty incidence— rural and urban— by roughly 1.0 percentage 
point. They also appear to reduce extreme poverty more in the rural than in the urban sector, with 
the incidence o f rural extreme poverty falling by 1.5 percentage points, compared with only 1.0 
percentage point in the urban sector. All o f these changes are statistically significant (Table 13).
This result may seem surprising, particularly since protection in agriculture is reduced 
under CAFTA. The poor gain because the growth rates o f both employment and income are 
projected to be higher under CAFTA than without it. And while it is true that protection for 
agriculture falls under CAFTA, there are two points to keep in mind. First, protection o f sensitive 
products like corn, beans, and rice is reduced very slowly. Second, the reductions in tariffs permit 
expansions elsewhere that more than offset whatever negative effects CAFTA may have in 
particular subsectors.
1. Results of the microsimulations
For the urban sector, the poverty and extreme poverty lines are equal to $88 and $42 in US 
dollars. For the rural sector, the two lines are $55 and $28. All of these are relatively high lines by the 
standards of countries at the Honduras level of development.
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N ot only does the tariff reduction under CAFTA help the poor, it also slightly improves 
the distribution o f income. Compare the Theil coefficients in 2020 in the baseline and tariff-cut 
scenarios. The Gini coefficient appears to be unchanged, but the Theil, which gives more weight 
to the bottom of the distribution, goes down by two points in the rural sector and one in the 
urban. Both changes are statistically significant. This is an important and somewhat surprising 
result. Recall that in the tariff-cut scenario the rate o f growth o f skilled employment increases 
slightly over the baseline and so does the relative wage o f the skilled. Those changes are small, 
which is why the distribution o f labor income is the same in both the baseline and tariff cut 
scenarios. At the household level, adding the wages o f formerly unemployed, unskilled workers 
to the ranks o f the employed makes a sufficient difference at the bottom of the income pyramid to 
more than offset the absolute gains in employment and wages for the skilled.
The continuation o f special market-access conditions for the maquila industry under 
CAFTA is even more favorable for the poor than the tariff reductions under CAFTA. Compare 
the MAQUILA column for 2020 in Table 12 with either the BASELINE or TARCUT columns. 
At the national level, poverty falls by a remarkable 7 percentage points relative to the baseline 
and 6 percentage points relative to tariff cuts. Even though the maquila industry is mainly an 
urban activity, poverty actually declines further in the rural sector than it does in the urban. This 
is because the additional employment and income generated in this sector increases the demand 
for agricultural commodities produced by the poor ju st as much as it does for items produced in 
the cities.
The effects on the distribution o f household income in the maquila scenario illustrate the 
progressive impact o f this industry on the Honduran economy. The distribution o f labor income 
does not change much because rising skill differentials for the skilled in the urban sector just 
about offset gains by the unskilled in the rural sector. But when we look at the change in 
distribution o f family income, the picture is entirely different. There the additional income 
generated by job growth, particularly for the unskilled, drives the national Gini down from 0.65 
to 0.62 and the Theil, from 1.02 to 0.94, and both changes are statistically significant. And as a 
closer look at the urban and rural distribution data shows, the favorable impact o f maquila is 
actually greater in the rural sector than in the urban.
The reason for these favorable results is job creation, particularly for unskilled women. 
Employment growth overall in the maquila simulation rises from 2.7 percent in the baseline to 
3.7 percent. For unskilled women, the growth rate rises from 2.8 to 4.0 percent. This is the rare 
case o f a growth and employment trajectory led by unskilled labor. It underlines the general point 
that the most effective way to reduce poverty is through job creation. If  the leading sectors are 
themselves big employers o f the unskilled, as maquila is, the result is all the more favorable for 
the poor.
Table 12





CAFTA FDI Baseline Tarcut1 Maquila Allcafta FDI
National
Labor income 3 349.1 3 402.9 3 405.1 3 406.4 3 409.4 3 431.6 3 469.5 3 477.4 3 463.9 3 470.4 3 449.3
Theil - labor income 0.93 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.95
Gini - labor income 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64
Per capita Hh income 1 643.7 1 715.1 1 728.9 1 811.8 1 828.3 2 065.2 1 833.3 1 880.9 2 115.0 2 165.0 2 602.6
Poverty incidence 70.07% 68.79% 68.47% 66.16% 65.80% 59.76% 66.38% 65.33% 59.10% 57.99% 50.84%
Poverty gap 40.68% 39.35% 39.03% 36.83% 36.48% 30.99% 37.13% 36.08% 30.38% 29.48% 24.35%
Poverty severity 28.77% 27.60% 27.33% 25.40% 25.09% 20.47% 25.67% 24.76% 19.95% 19.25% 15.28%
Ext poverty incidence 45.27% 43.75% 43.37% 40.60% 40.20% 33.41% 40.90% 39.71% 32.62% 31.50% 25.46%
Ext poverty gap 23.81% 22.69% 22.42% 20.56% 20.26% 15.91% 20.83% 19.95% 15.41% 14.78% 11.29%
Ext poverty severity 16.08% 15.21% 15.00% 13.57% 13.35% 10.10% 13.79% 13.12% 9.75% 9.31% 6.85%
Theil - per capita HH income 1.03 1.03 1.02 0.99 0.99 0.93 1.02 1.01 0.94 0.93 1.02
Gini - per capita HH income 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.64 0.64 0.62 0.65 0.65 0.62 0.62 0.63
Rural
Labor income 1 879.3 1 910.4 1 915.3 1 952.6 1 959.9 2048.0 1 957.3 1 973.8 2 061.5 2 072.4 2 129.4
Theil - labor income 1.01 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.98 0.94 0.99 0.99 0.94 0.94 0.91
Gini - labor income 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.63 0.63 0.63
Per capita Hh income 879.6 916.2 923.5 977.5 990.7 1142.0 980.5 1 008.5 1 170.1 1 200.3 1 467.8
Poverty incidence 79.54% 78.32% 78.03% 75.66% 75.15% 68.91% 75.88% 74.85% 68.06% 66.80% 59.20%
Poverty gap 50.20% 48.65% 48.34% 45.79% 45.21% 38.75% 46.01% 44.79% 37.85% 36.76% 30.65%
Poverty severity 37.02% 35.58% 35.29% 32.95% 32.44% 26.72% 33.15% 32.05% 25.93% 25.03% 20.03%
Ext poverty incidence 59.54% 57.76% 57.38% 54.16% 53.49% 45.26% 54.24% 52.87% 44.08% 42.70% 35.12%
Ext poverty gap 33.17% 31.69% 31.39% 28.99% 28.46% 22.74% 29.20% 28.06% 21.93% 21.07% 16.27%
Ext poverty severity 22.74% 21.56% 21.32% 19.44% 19.04% 14.67% 19.62% 18.73% 14.09% 13.46% 10.01%
Theil - per capita HH income 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.93 0.92 0.83 0.95 0.93 0.83 0.82 0.89








CAFTA FDI Baseline Tarcut1 Maquila Allcafta FDI
Urban
Labor income 4 779.9 4 847.5 4 841.2 4 793.3 4 800.4 4 732.0 4 923.6 4 915.6 4 790.7 4 791.5 4 687.5
Theil - labor income 0.74 0.76 0.76 0.77 0.77 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.82 0.82 0.84
Gini - labor income 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.59 0.59 0.60 0.59 0.59 0.60 0.60 0.61
Per capita Hh income 2462.7 2 571.4 2 592.2 2 706.1 2 726.3 3 054.8 2 747.5 2 816.2 3 128.0 3 199.1 3 819.1
Poverty incidence 59.90% 58.55% 58.20% 55.96% 55.76% 49.93% 56.16% 55.10% 49.47% 48.53% 41.86%
Poverty gap 30.45% 29.36% 29.03% 27.20% 27.10% 22.66% 27.59% 26.72% 22.35% 21.66% 17.60%
Poverty severity 19.91% 19.03% 18.77% 17.29% 17.21% 13.76% 17.64% 16.93% 13.53% 13.03% 10.17%
Ext poverty incidence 29.94% 28.70% 28.31% 26.03% 25.93% 20.69% 26.57% 25.57% 20.30% 19.48% 15.08%
Ext poverty gap 13.76% 13.02% 12.79% 11.51% 11.44% 8.58% 11.84% 11.23% 8.41% 8.03% 5.94%
Ext poverty severity 8.93% 8.39% 8.21% 7.27% 7.23% 5.19% 7.54% 7.09% 5.09% 4.85% 3.47%
Theil - per capita HH income 0.88 0.88 0.87 0.85 0.86 0.82 0.88 0.87 0.83 0.83 0.92
Gini - per capita HH income 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.59 0.59 0.58 0.60 0.60 0.58 0.58 0.59
Source: Authors’ worksheets.
36
STANDARD ERRORS AND CONFIDENCE INTERVALS FOR POVERTY AND DISTRIBUTION ESTIMATES IN 2020
Table 13
 B ase lin e -2 0 2 0 __________  T a rc u t1 -2 0 2 0 __________   M aq u ila -2 0 2 0 __________   A ll  C afta -2 0 2 0_________   F D I--2 0 2 0 __________
M ean  9 5 %  con f. in te rv a l M ean  9 5 %  con f. in te rv a l M ea n  9 5 %  c o n f  .in te rv a l M ean  9 5 %  con f. in te rv a l M ean  9 5 %  con f. in te rv a l
National
L a b o r in co m e  
T h e il - la b o r  in co m e  
G in i - la b o r  in co m e  
P e r  c a p i ta  H h  in co m e  
P o v e r ty  in c id e n ce  
P o v e rty  g a p  
P o v e r ty  sev e rity  
E x t p o v e rty  in c id e n c e  
E x t p o v e rty  gap  
E x t p o v e rty  sev e rity  
T h e il - p e r  c a p i ta  H H  in co m e  
G in i - p e r  c a p i ta  H H  in co m e
Rural
L a b o r in co m e  
T h e il - la b o r  in co m e  
G in i - la b o r  in co m e  
P e r  c a p i ta  H h  in co m e  
P o v e rty  in c id e n c e  
P o v e rty  g a p  
P o v e rty  sev e rity  
E x t p o v e rty  in c id e n c e  
E x t p o v e rty  gap  
E x t p o v e rty  se v e rity  
T h e il - p e r  c a p i ta  H H  in co m e  
G in i - p e r  c a p i ta  H H  in co m e
3 46 9 .5 3 469 .1 3 4 6 9 .8
0 .963 0 .963 0 .963
0 .6 4 0 0 .6 4 0 0 .6 4 0
1 833 .3 1 833.1 1 833 .4
6 6 .3 8 % 6 6 .3 3 % 6 6 .4 2 %
3 7 .1 3 % 3 7 .1 1 % 3 7 .1 5 %
2 5 .6 7 % 2 5 .6 5 % 2 5 .7 0 %
4 0 .9 0 % 4 0 .8 5 % 4 0 .9 4 %
2 0 .8 3 % 2 0 .8 0 % 2 0 .8 5 %
13 .79% 13 .77% 13 .82%
1.019 1.018 1.019
0 .6 4 8 0 .6 4 8 0 .6 4 8
1 957 .3 1 95 4 .7 1 95 9 .8
0 .9 9 4 0 .9 9 2 0 .9 9 6
0 .6 4 2 0 .6 4 2 0 .6 4 2
980 .5 979 .5 98 1 .6
7 5 .8 8 % 7 5 .8 1 % 7 5 .9 6 %
4 6 .0 1 % 4 5 .9 6 % 4 6 .0 6 %
3 3 .1 5 % 3 3 .1 0 % 3 3 .2 0 %
5 4 .2 4 % 5 4 .1 6 % 5 4 .3 1 %
2 9 .2 0 % 2 9 .1 4 % 2 9 .2 5 %
19 .62% 19 .57% 19 .67%
0 .9 4 9 0 .9 4 8 0.951
0 .6 2 2 0 .6 2 2 0 .6 2 2
3 4 7 7 .4 3 477 .1 3 4 7 7 .7
0 .963 0 .963 0 .963
0.641 0.641 0.641
1 880 .9 1 880 .8 1881.1
6 5 .3 3 % 6 5 .2 9 % 6 5 .3 7 %
3 6 .0 8 % 3 6 .0 5 % 3 6 .1 1 %
2 4 .7 6 % 2 4 .7 3 % 2 4 .7 9 %
3 9 .7 1 % 3 9 .6 5 % 3 9 .7 6 %
19 .95% 19 .92% 19 .98%
13 .12% 13 .09% 13 .15%
1.009 1.009 1.010
0 .645 0 .645 0 .645
1 9 7 3 .8 1 971 .1 1 976 .5
0 .9 8 6 0 .9 8 4 0 .9 8 8
0.641 0.641 0.641
1 008 .5 1 0 0 7 .4 1 0 0 9 .6
7 4 .8 5 % 7 4 .8 0 % 7 4 .9 1 %
4 4 .7 9 % 4 4 .7 4 % 4 4 .8 4 %
3 2 .0 5 % 3 2 .0 0 % 3 2 .0 9 %
5 2 .8 7 % 5 2 .7 8 % 5 2 .9 6 %
2 8 .0 6 % 2 8 .0 1 % 2 8 .1 2 %
18 .73% 18 .68% 18 .78%
0 .9 3 4 0 .9 3 2 0 .935
0 .6 1 8 0 .6 1 7 0 .6 1 8
3 4 6 3 .9 3 4 6 3 .6 3 4 6 4 .2
0 .9 5 4 0 .9 5 4 0 .9 5 4
0 .6 3 9 0 .6 3 9 0 .6 3 9
2  115.0 2  114.9 2  115.2
5 9 .1 0 % 5 9 .0 4 % 5 9 .1 5 %
3 0 .3 8 % 3 0 .3 5 % 3 0 .4 1 %
19 .95% 19 .92% 19 .99%
3 2 .6 2 % 3 2 .5 5 % 3 2 .6 8 %
15 .41% 15 .37% 15 .45%
9 .7 5 % 9 .7 1 % 9 .7 8 %
0.9 4 0 0 .9 4 0 0.941
0 .625 0 .625 0 .625
2  061 .5 2  05 8 .7 2  06 4 .4
0 .943 0.941 0 .945
0 .635 0 .6 3 4 0 .635
1 170.1 1 168.7 1 171.5
6 8 .0 6 % 6 7 .9 5 % 6 8 .1 6 %
3 7 .8 5 % 3 7 .7 9 % 3 7 .9 2 %
2 5 .9 3 % 2 5 .8 7 % 2 6 .0 0 %
4 4 .0 8 % 4 3 .9 8 % 4 4 .1 8 %
2 1 .9 3 % 2 1 .8 6 % 2 2 .0 1 %
1 4 .09% 14 .02% 14 .15%
0 .833 0.831 0 .8 3 4
0 .5 8 9 0 .5 8 9 0 .5 9 0
3 4 7 0 .4 3 470 .1 3 4 7 0 .6
0 .9 5 4 0 .9 5 4 0 .9 5 4
0 .6 4 0 0 .6 4 0 0 .6 4 0
2  165.0 2  164.8 2  165.1
5 7 .9 9 % 5 7 .9 3 % 5 8 .0 5 %
2 9 .4 8 % 2 9 .4 4 % 2 9 .5 1 %
1 9 .25% 19 .22% 19 .28%
3 1 .5 0 % 3 1 .4 3 % 3 1 .5 8 %
1 4 .78% 14 .75% 14 .82%
9 .3 1 % 9 .2 8 % 9 .3 4 %
0 .9 3 4 0 .933 0 .9 3 4
0 .6 2 3 0 .623 0 .623
2  0 7 2 .4 2  0 6 9 .4 2  07 5 .4
0 .9 3 7 0 .9 3 4 0 .9 3 9
0 .6 3 4 0 .633 0 .6 3 4
1 2 0 0 .3 1 198.7 1 2 0 1 .9
6 6 .8 0 % 6 6 .6 8 % 6 6 .9 1 %
3 6 .7 6 % 3 6 .6 9 % 3 6 .8 3 %
2 5 .0 3 % 2 4 .9 7 % 2 5 .1 0 %
4 2 .7 0 % 4 2 .5 7 % 4 2 .8 3 %
2 1 .0 7 % 2 1 .0 0 % 2 1 .1 4 %
1 3 .46% 13 .40% 13 .51%
0 .8 2 0 0 .8 1 9 0 .8 2 2
0 .5 8 6 0 .585 0 .5 8 6
3 44 9 .3 3 4 4 9 .0 3 44 9 .5
0 .9 4 7 0 .9 4 7 0 .9 4 7
0 .6 3 8 0 .6 3 8 0 .6 3 8
2  6 0 2 .6 2  602 .5 2  6 0 2 .8
5 0 .8 4 % 5 0 .7 7 % 5 0 .9 1 %
2 4 .3 5 % 2 4 .3 2 % 2 4 .3 9 %
15 .28% 15 .25% 15 .30%
2 5 .4 6 % 2 5 .3 9 % 2 5 .5 2 %
11 .29% 11 .26% 11 .32%
6 .8 5 % 6 .8 3 % 6 .8 8 %
1. 016 1.015 1.016
0 .6 2 8 0 .6 2 8 0 .6 2 8
2  129.4 2  125.8 2  132.9
0 .911 0 .9 0 9 0 .913
0 .6 2 9 0 .6 2 9 0 .6 3 0
1 4 6 7 .8 1 466 .1 1 4 6 9 .6
5 9 .2 0 % 5 9 .0 8 % 5 9 .3 3 %
3 0 .6 5 % 3 0 .5 9 % 3 0 .7 0 %
2 0 .0 3 % 19 .98% 2 0 .0 8 %
3 5 .1 2 % 3 5 .0 1 % 3 5 .2 4 %
16 .27% 16 .21% 16 .33%
10 .01% 9 .9 6 % 10 .05%
0.8 8 9 0 .8 8 8 0 .8 9 0




B ase lin e -2 0 2 0 T a rc u t1 -2 0 2 0 M aq u ila -2 0 2 0 A ll C afta -2 0 2 0 F D I-2 0 2 0
M ea n 9 5 %  c o n f. in te rv a l M ea n 9 5 %  c o n f. in te rv a l M ean 9 5 %  c o n f. in te rv a l M ean 9 5 %  c o n f. In te rv a l M ean 9 5 %  conf. in te rv a l
Urban
L a b o r in co m e 4  9 2 3 .6 4  921 .1 4  926 .1 4  9 1 5 .6 4  9 1 2 .8 4  9 1 8 .4 4  79 0 .7 4  78 7 .8 4  79 3 .7 4  791 .5 4  7 8 8 .4 4  79 4 .6 4  687 .5 4  68 4 .0 4  6 9 1 .0
T h e il - la b o r  in co m e 0 .7 8 8 0 .7 8 7 0 .7 8 9 0 .7 9 4 0 .793 0 .7 9 4 0 .8 1 7 0 .8 1 6 0 .8 1 8 0.821 0 .8 2 0 0 .8 2 2 0 .8 3 6 0 .835 0 .8 3 7
G in i - la b o r in co m e 0 .593 0 .5 9 2 0 .593 0 .595 0 .595 0 .595 0 .603 0 .603 0 .6 0 4 0 .605 0 .605 0 .605 0 .6 1 0 0 .6 0 9 0 .6 1 0
P e r c a p i ta  H h  in c o m e 2  747 .5 2  74 6 .4 2  748 .5 2  816 .2 2  815 .0 2  817 .3 3 128.0 3 126.4 3 129.5 3 199.1 3 197.3 3 2 0 0 .8 3 819.1 3 817 .3 3 821 .0
P o v e rty  in c id e n c e 5 6 .1 6 % 5 6 .1 1 % 5 6 .2 2 % 5 5 .1 0 % 5 5 .0 3 % 5 5 .1 6 % 4 9 .4 7 % 4 9 .3 9 % 4 9 .5 5 % 4 8 .5 3 % 4 8 .4 6 % 4 8 .6 1 % 4 1 .8 6 % 4 1 .7 6 % 4 1 .9 5 %
P o v e rty  g a p 2 7 .5 9 % 2 7 .5 6 % 2 7 .6 2 % 2 6 .7 2 % 2 6 .6 9 % 2 6 .7 5 % 2 2 .3 5 % 2 2 .3 0 % 2 2 .3 9 % 2 1 .6 6 % 2 1 .6 1 % 2 1 .7 0 % 17 .60% 17 .55% 17 .64%
P o v e rty  sev e rity 17 .64% 17 .61% 17 .66% 16 .93% 16 .91% 16 .96% 13 .53% 13 .49% 13 .57% 13 .03% 12 .99% 13 .07% 10 .17% 10 .14% 10 .20%
E x t p o v e rty  in c id e n ce 2 6 .5 7 % 2 6 .5 1 % 2 6 .6 3 % 2 5 .5 7 % 2 5 .5 1 % 2 5 .6 4 % 2 0 .3 0 % 2 0 .2 3 % 2 0 .3 8 % 19 .48% 19 .39% 19 .56% 15 .08% 14 .99% 15 .16%
E x t p o v e rty  gap 11 .84% 11 .81% 11 .87% 11 .23% 11 .20% 11 .26% 8 .4 1 % 8 .3 6 % 8 .4 5 % 8 .0 3 % 7 .9 9 % 8 .0 7 % 5 .9 4 % 5 .9 0 % 5 .9 7 %
E x t p o v e rty  sev e rity 7 .5 4 % 7 .5 1 % 7 .5 6 % 7 .0 9 % 7 .0 6 % 7 .1 1 % 5 .0 9 % 5 .0 5 % 5 .1 2 % 4 .8 5 % 4 .8 2 % 4 .8 8 % 3 .4 7 % 3 .4 4 % 3 .4 9 %
T h eil - p e r  c a p i ta  H H  in co m e 0 .8 7 8 0 .8 7 7 0 .8 7 9 0 .8 7 2 0.871 0 .8 7 2 0 .8 2 8 0 .8 2 8 0 .8 2 9 0 .825 0 .8 2 4 0 .8 2 6 0.921 0 .9 2 0 0.921
G in i - p e r  c a p i ta  H H  in co m e 0 .5 9 9 0 .5 9 8 0 .5 9 9 0 .5 9 7 0 .5 9 7 0 .5 9 7 0 .5 8 4 0 .583 0 .5 8 4 0 .583 0 .583 0 .583 0 .5 9 4 0 .5 9 4 0 .5 9 4
S ource: A u th o rs ’ w o rk sh ee ts . 38
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There is, however, a problem of perception with respect to maquila. CAFTA does not 
actually change current conditions for the domestic textile industry. Rather it makes permanent 
the liberalized rules o f origin enjoyed by the industry since 2000. In the popular mind that may 
not seem like much o f a benefit, since the country already has it. But without CAFTA, the 
temporary benefits granted in 2000 will expire. O ur results say that if  that happened, growth 
would fall by 1.4 percent per year and employment for unskilled and semi-skilled labor would 
fall by 26 percent relative to what can be expected with CAFTA. 19 Although these are large 
effects, one must keep in mind that they do not take into account possible changes in external 
conditions due to the end o f the M ultifiber Agreement in 2005.
The next scenario, ALLCAFTA, applies both the CAFTA tariff cuts and maquila market 
access conditions at the same time. The results are approximately equal to the sum of the two 
scenarios considered separately. Tariff cuts alone reduce poverty by about 1 percentage point 
relative to the baseline. Adding those same tariff cuts to maquila reduces poverty by about 1 
percentage point relative to what was achieved under maquila alone. W e see the same favorable 
effect on the distribution statistics for household income; the national Theil falls by one point 
relative to maquila ju st as it did relative to the baseline in the TARCUT1 scenario.
The ALLCAFTA simulation is our best estimate o f the effects that CAFTA is likely to
20have on poverty and the distribution o f income. I f  we compare the results o f ALLCAFTA with 
those o f MAQUILA, it is obvious that maquila is the part o f the agreement that really makes a 
difference. Tariff cuts help. They are progressive and increase the rate o f growth o f employment 
slightly. M aquila is another story entirely. It generates a lot o f employment, significantly reduces 
both moderate and extreme poverty levels in both the rural and urban sectors, and increases the 
overall growth rate o f the economy. O f the total change in poverty in the ALLCAFTA simulation 
(8.4 percentage points) fully 87 percent comes from the maquila component, and only 13 percent 
from tariff cuts. M uch attention has been focused on the effects o f CAFTA tariff cuts on 
agriculture. Our results indicate that this focus misses the main favorable impact o f the 
agreement— making permanent the favorable market access conditions o f the CBTPA.
The FD I simulation, which we look at next, underlines the key point we have just made 
about the central role o f employment creation in poverty reduction. Recall that in the FD I 
simulation, we ask what would happen if  the CAFTA treatment o f foreign direct investment did 
in fact result in an increased inflow o f foreign funds linked to productive investments in the 
private sector. W e repeat our earlier point that this simulation is purely speculative. W e have no 
way o f knowing whether foreign firms will react favorably to CAFTA. Instead we are interested 
in examining what the implications would be if  they did respond favorably.
To do that, we assume that FDI increased by 25 percent over the level o f observed capital 
transfers to Honduras between 2000 and 2004. But the really important part o f this simulation is 
the assumption that all this additional foreign exchange is channeled into productive investment.
19 This percentage is the difference between total employment for the unskilled and semi-skilled 
male and female labor in 2020 in the maquila experiment, compared with the baseline in 2020.
20 The FDI simulation, which we will examine next, is far more speculative, since it 
incorporates uncertain reactions of foreign investors to changes in the treatment of intellectual property 
rights and legal protections for foreign investment.
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The results o f this increase in capital formation are dramatic. In Table 12, we see that per capita 
income in 2020 in the FD I run is fully 41 percent higher than the base run, and even 20 percent 
higher than in the ALLCAFTA simulation. Growth rises to 5.3 percent, compared to 3.1 percent 
in the base run. All that additional growth and output mean more employment as well. W ith 
higher capital formation comes more employment, with the total number o f jobs expanding at 5.8 
percent per year, more than double the growth rate in the base run.
The results for poverty are as dramatic as those on employment and production. By 2020 
the national poverty rate falls by 7 percentage points relative to the ALLCAFTA scenario and 
almost 16 points compared with the baseline. Because, by assumption, this additional capital is 
available to all sectors, rural and urban, FDI benefits both sectors and the extremely poor as well. 
This complements the earlier point that employment creation is a central element in sustainable 
poverty reduction. This simulation makes the point that the surest way to rapidly increase 
employment is through higher rates o f capital formation. Indeed, the rate o f job creation in this 
simulation is so high that whether it is feasible is unclear.
W hile increased FD I has a large positive impact on poverty, it also increases inequality, 
partly as a result o f a rise in inequality in the urban sector more than offsetting a rise in equality 
in the rural sector. Overall, the Theil indicates that the distribution o f labor income is almost 
constant, compared with the baseline scenario, while it actually improves slightly using the Gini. 
In the rural sector, the distribution o f labor income is significantly more equitable in the FDI 
simulation than in the baseline, but just the opposite is true in the urban sector. These differences 
are accentuated by the profit component. The declining profit rate in the FD I simulation is more 
than offset by the very large increase in the total supply o f capital and in the incomes o f the 
holders o f capital in the survey. This is particularly obvious if  one compares the distributions of 
household income in the ALLCAFTA and FDI simulations. In the ALLCAFTA simulation, all 
the distribution statistics show equality increasing, reflecting higher employment growth led by 
the unskilled. In the FDI simulation, the rate of employment growth is even higher and is led by 
the unskilled. But in the Theil, there is a big increase in inequality in the household distribution, 
particularly at the national level, even though the distribution o f wage income in the rural sector 
is actually more equal in the FDI than in the ALLCAFTA. That has to reflect the influence of 
returns to capital.
2. Decomposing the changes in poverty and distribution
The changes in poverty and distribution in Table 12 for the different scenarios are the result of 
changes in employment, in the skill composition o f the employed labor force, and in relative 
wages. W e can use the microsimulation methodology to get an idea o f how important each of 
these changes is to the final observations in the table.
The microsimulation procedure used to derive the results in Table 12 is a way o f 
estimating the poverty and distributional impact o f the changes in the labor market, determined 
by a CGE equilibrium solution and including changes in unemployment, labor force structure, or 
skill composition and relative wages. Since these changes are made sequentially in the 
microsimulation, we can make a “quasi-decomposition” o f the overall change in poverty or 
distribution, according to statistics calculated separately at each stage o f the microsimulation. In
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other words, we can ask what the poverty or distribution level would be if  the overall 
employment growth had stayed as it was in the CGE solution but with labor force structure and 
relative wages held constant. W e can repeat this procedure at each step o f the microsimulation 
and calculate the change in poverty and distribution resulting from the particular change in the 
labor market solution (see Table 14). W e call this a “quasi-decomposition” because one cannot 
build up to the final CGE solution in this way. The CGE is not asked to determine the rate of 
growth o f total employment, holding the labor force structure constant. If  it were, the overall rate 
o f growth o f employment would almost certainly have been lower than the one determined by the 
CGE. W e can ask what the effect on poverty is o f a change in total employment, holding the 
labor force structure constant, but that is not a CGE solution, nor is it a part o f the CGE solution. 
Indeed the whole point o f the CGE is that overall growth will almost certainly involve changes in 
labor force structure and relative wages. Having said this, it is still instructive to undertake this 
quasi-decomposition to get an idea o f which o f the various changes in the labor market seem to 
have had the biggest impact on poverty and the distribution.
There are three columns for each o f the scenarios for the year 2020 in Table 14. The first, 
labeled E, gives the results from employment growth alone, holding both the skill composition 
(S) and relative wages (W) at their 2005 levels. It applies the rate o f growth o f total employment 
in each scenario to each category o f labor. For example, in the baseline scenario, total 
employment grows at 2.7 percent per year between 2005 and 2020. That rate is applied to all the 
categories o f labor used in the model. The microsimulation brings enough workers out of 
unemployment or inactivity to reach that rate and then assigns them the average wage observed in 
the base year for that particular type o f labor.
The second column, labeled S, changes the skill composition o f the employed labor force 
so that in 2020 the rate o f growth by skill category and gender o f the labor force is consistent 
with the CGE model solution for 2020. In this case, the microsimulation brings enough workers 
out o f unemployment or inactivity to reach the rate o f growth o f employment for each skill class 
generated by the CGE model for 2020. It assigns to each new worker the average wage by skill 
observed in the base year. Finally, in the column labeled W, we show the effect o f changing 
relative wages by giving each o f the workers in the S or skill-level solution the wage shown in 
the CGE solution for 2020, rather than the one from the base year. The W  columns for each 
scenario are identical to the columns for 2020 in Table 12.
There are three main points to be gleaned from Table 14. First, the growth in total 
employment is far and away the most important driver o f poverty reduction in all o f the 
scenarios. Second, employment in each o f the growth strategies, even maquila, is led by skilled 
labor. Third, despite the rise in the wage differential in favor o f the better educated, poverty 
incidence is lower when we incorporate the higher differential into household income. W e now 
discuss the evidence supporting these conclusions and the implications.
Table 14
DECOMPOSITION OF CAFTA EFFECTS IN 2020
2004 Baseline Tarcut1 Maquila All CAFTA FDI
E S W E S W E S W E S W E S W
National
Labor income 3 349.1 3 358.9 3 376.2 3 469.5 3 357.2 3 378.8 3 477.4 3 341.1 3 344.2 3 463.9 3 341.4 3 345.6 3 470.4 3 315.6 3 291.1 3 449.3
Theil - labor income 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.96 0.92 0.93 0.96 0.91 0.91 0.95 0.91 0.91 0.95 0.89 0.89 0.95
Gini - labor income 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.63 0.62 0.64
Per capita Hh income 1 643.7 1 751.5 1 756.2 1 833.3 1 783.0 1 790.6 1 880.9 1 971.8 1 972.6 2 115.0 2 006.8 2 007.6 2 165.0 2 142.9 2 129.4 2 602.6
Poverty incidence 70.07% 66.95% 67.01% 66.38% 66.02% 66.05% 65.33% 60.08% 60.13% 59.10% 58.93% 59.07% 57.99% 54.44% 54.48% 50.84%
Poverty gap 40.68% 37.45% 37.55% 37.13% 36.49% 36.59% 36.08% 31.03% 31.08% 30.38% 30.12% 30.24% 29.48% 26.46% 26.45% 24.35%
Poverty severity 28.77% 25.91% 26.01% 25.67% 25.04% 25.16% 24.76% 20.43% 20.48% 19.95% 19.71% 19.81% 19.25% 16.80% 16.77% 15.28%
Ext poverty incidence 45.27% 41.31% 41.43% 40.90% 40.15% 40.29% 39.71% 33.43% 33.49% 32.62% 32.29% 32.46% 31.50% 27.88% 27.85% 25.46%
Ext poverty gap 23.81% 21.02% 21.13% 20.83% 20.17% 20.30% 19.95% 15.82% 15.87% 15.41% 15.17% 15.27% 14.78% 12.55% 12.51% 11.29%
Ext poverty severity 16.08% 13.93% 14.01% 13.79% 13.25% 13.37% 13.12% 10.02% 10.06% 9.75% 9.56% 9.64% 9.31% 7.70% 7.66% 6.85%
Theil - per capita HH income 1.03 0.98 0.98 1.02 0.96 0.96 1.01 0.87 0.87 0.94 0.86 0.86 0.93 0.80 0.79 1.02
Gini - per capita HH income 0.65 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.63 0.64 0.65 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.59 0.59 0.63
Rural
Labor income 1 879.3 1 945.0 1 942.9 1 957.3 1 957.9 1 958.7 1 973.8 2 045.6 2 043.3 2 061.5 2 054.7 2 053.6 2 072.4 2 107.8 2 105.4 2 129.4
Theil - labor income 1.01 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.97 0.97 0.99 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.92 0.92 0.94 0.89 0.89 0.91
Gini - labor income 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63
Per capita Hh income 879.6 955.6 953.2 980.5 975.8 975.3 1 008.5 1 115.4 1 115.2 1 170.1 1 137.1 1 138.9 1 200.3 1 247.5 1 246.1 1 467.8
Poverty incidence 79.54% 76.14% 76.29% 75.88% 75.22% 75.31% 74.85% 68.81% 68.78% 68.06% 67.61% 67.58% 66.80% 62.45% 62.51% 59.20%
Poverty gap 50.20% 46.24% 46.41% 46.01% 45.21% 45.28% 44.79% 38.58% 38.56% 37.85% 37.53% 37.53% 36.76% 32.89% 32.92% 30.65%
Poverty severity 37.02% 33.36% 33.52% 33.15% 32.39% 32.48% 32.05% 26.55% 26.53% 25.93% 25.67% 25.68% 25.03% 21.82% 21.83% 20.03%
Ext poverty incidence 59.54% 54.67% 54.82% 54.24% 53.46% 53.49% 52.87% 45.10% 45.07% 44.08% 43.74% 43.82% 42.70% 37.95% 38.06% 35.12%
Ext poverty gap 33.17% 29.40% 29.56% 29.20% 28.40% 28.50% 28.06% 22.54% 22.52% 21.93% 21.69% 21.70% 21.07% 17.97% 17.97% 16.27%
Ext poverty severity 22.74% 19.77% 19.91% 19.62% 18.96% 19.08% 18.73% 14.54% 14.52% 14.09% 13.91% 13.92% 13.46% 11.21% 11.18% 10.01%
Theil - per capita HH income 0.99 0.91 0.92 0.95 0.89 0.90 0.93 0.78 0.78 0.83 0.76 0.76 0.82 0.69 0.69 0.89




2004 Baseline Tarcut1 Maquila All CAFTA FDI
E S W E S W E S W E S W E S W
Urban
Labor income 4 779.9 4 720.3 4 754.5 4 923.6 4 696.5 4 737.1 4 915.6 4 564.0 4 575.0 4 790.7 4 549.8 4 566.7 4 791.5 4 448.0 4 403.5 4 687.5
Theil - labor income 0.74 0.75 0.75 0.79 0.76 0.76 0.79 0.77 0.77 0.82 0.77 0.77 0.82 0.77 0.77 0.84
Gini - labor income 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.59 0.58 0.58 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.60 0.59 0.59 0.60 0.59 0.59 0.61
Per capita Hh income 2 462.7 2 604.6 2 616.9 2 747.5 2 648.3 2 664.5 2 816.2 2 889.8 2 891.6 3 128.0 2 939.0 2 938.9 3 199.1 3 102.7 3 076.3 3 819.1
Poverty incidence 59.90% 57.07% 57.04% 56.16% 56.14% 56.10% 55.10% 50.70% 50.84% 49.47% 49.60% 49.93% 48.53% 45.85% 45.86% 41.86%
Poverty gap 30.45% 28.00% 28.04% 27.59% 27.13% 27.25% 26.72% 22.92% 23.05% 22.35% 22.17% 22.41% 21.66% 19.55% 19.49% 17.60%
Poverty severity 19.91% 17.90% 17.94% 17.64% 17.15% 17.29% 16.93% 13.86% 13.98% 13.53% 13.31% 13.51% 13.03% 11.41% 11.33% 10.17%
Ext poverty incidence 29.94% 26.96% 27.05% 26.57% 25.87% 26.10% 25.57% 20.89% 21.06% 20.30% 19.99% 20.26% 19.48% 17.07% 16.89% 15.08%
Ext poverty gap 13.76% 12.02% 12.07% 11.84% 11.34% 11.49% 11.23% 8.60% 8.72% 8.41% 8.18% 8.36% 8.03% 6.73% 6.64% 5.94%
Ext poverty severity 8.93% 7.65% 7.67% 7.54% 7.11% 7.24% 7.09% 5.16% 5.26% 5.09% 4.89% 5.04% 4.85% 3.94% 3.88% 3.47%
Theil - per capita HH income 0.88 0.84 0.84 0.88 0.83 0.83 0.87 0.76 0.76 0.83 0.75 0.76 0.83 0.71 0.71 0.92




Consider the employment effect first. To see how big a component o f the total change in 
poverty it is, compare the change in poverty between 2004 and the column labeled E with the 
total change between 2004 and column W  for each scenario. For example, in the tariff-cut 
scenario, national poverty falls from 70.1 percent in 2004 to 66.0 percent in 2020 just from 
employment creation, holding skill structure and relative wages constant. W hen we allow both of 
those other factors to vary in column W, poverty falls an additional 0.7 percentage points to 65.3 
percent. In other words, out o f the total change o f 4.74 percentage points in poverty, induced by 
CAFTA, 85 percent comes from employment growth alone. The same pattern is repeated in each 
o f the other scenarios. The faster the economy grows, the more employment it creates and the 
more poverty reduction there is, even if  that growth is skill-intensive as is the case in the FDI 
scenario.
All the growth strategies, including the baseline, generate a higher demand for skilled 
labor than for unskilled. That is why in each scenario the incidence o f poverty in the S column is 
higher than in E. Recall that by definition in the sequential microsimulation exercise, the E 
column tells us what the poverty incidence would be if  the structure o f employment was 
unchanged from the base, and employment in each skill class grew at the average rate o f growth 
o f total employment generated by the CGE model. In the S column simulation, we permit 
employment for different skill classes to grow at the rate determined by the CGE. At the national 
level in every case, growth o f the skilled labor force was higher than the average rate o f growth 
o f total employment, which means that employment for the unskilled underlying column S is 
lower than in the E column. This is what makes the poverty rates slightly higher in S than in E. 
W hat is also interesting is that the degree o f skill intensity appears to be slightly lower in the 
tariff-cut scenario than in the base run. In the latter, increasing skill intensity drives up poverty by
0.06 percent between E and S, whereas in the TARCUT1 microsimulation, the increase in 
poverty is only 0.03 percent. That says that growth under CAFTA-induced trade liberalization is 
less skill intensive than it would have been in the absence o f CAFTA. There are some rather 
curious divergences between the rural and urban sectors. In the base run, the incidence o f rural 
poverty rises quite a bit in response to more skill-intensive growth. In each o f the other 
simulations, it rises a bit less and in fact falls in both the M AQUILA and the ALLCAFTA 
simulations, which implies that CAFTA increases the rate o f growth o f unskilled labor in the 
rural sector relative to what it would have been otherwise. The opposite is true in the urban 
sector. In both the base run and TARCUT1, poverty is lower with the simulated change in skill 
intensity, and that is only reversed when we require much higher overall growth rates o f 
employment in the MAQUILA, ALLCAFTA, and FDI simulations.
The third result to be taken from Table 14 is that increasing the skill differential, which 
we do in each o f the W  columns, reduces the incidence o f poverty. Furthermore, when the FDI 
columns are compared with any o f the others, we see that the faster the rise in the wage 
differential and the more employment created for the skilled, the bigger the reduction in poverty. 
This is a surprising result. Recall that in the model real wages for the unskilled are constant, 
whereas employment and wages are endogenously determined for skilled labor. The faster the 
rate o f growth in the demand for the skilled, the bigger the wage differential will be. The 
difference between columns E and S is the isolated effect o f the wage changes coming from the 
CGE, since employment growth by skill is the same in both columns. This means that there must 
have been many poor households with educated members who were either unemployed or out of 
the labor force in the base year 2004. Putting them to work, even at the base-period wage, is one
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o f the reasons that the poverty rate falls from 2004 to the E column o f each o f the simulations. 
W hen we add on the rise in the relative wage as well, we reduce poverty even more. In the base 
run, for example, at the national level, the additional employment o f skilled and unskilled labor 
(column S) reduces the poverty rate from 70.1 to 67.0 percent. Since we are assuming a constant 
real wage for the unskilled, the only change between columns S and W  is that in W  we increase 
the relative wage o f the skilled by 12 percent relative to its base level, and that reduces poverty 
from 67.0 to 66.4 percent. The same result is repeated in each o f the other simulations, and for 
both the rural and the urban sectors. Rising skill intensity and rising skill differentials obviously 
help richer households. The distribution o f labor income becomes less equal. But our results say 
that they help the poor as well.
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In order to calculate the effects o f CAFTA, we built a dynamic CGE model with which to 
compare the trajectory o f employment and output with and without CAFTA. This comparison 
shows that the impact o f trade liberalization under CAFTA will be small but positive. Even with 
constant rates o f capital formation, it unambiguously increases the amount o f employment for the 
unskilled and helps the poor in both the rural and urban sectors. At the same time, in all the 
alternative CAFTA scenarios, relative wages for the skilled rise, while poverty declines. And in 
spite o f the rise in the wage differential, the distribution o f household income actually improves 
slightly because so many o f the new workers in the CAFTA scenarios come from poor families.
Critics o f CAFTA complain that smallholders will be hurt by the removel o f tariff 
protection for sensitive products such as corn, rice, beans, and pork, which are produced and 
consumed by the poor. Our results do not support this view. Both agriculture in general and 
subsistence agriculture in particular grow faster under CAFTA than could be expected otherwise. 
The increases in the growth rate are not large, but they are positive. That is partly because tariffs 
for many sensitive products will be reduced very slowly or not at all, and partly because the rise 
o f employment in other sectors more than compensates for any loss o f employment in the 
sensitive sectors themselves.
In spite o f the importance o f agriculture in the Honduran economy, it appears that the 
CAFTA provisions regarding the maquila sector are actually more significant for poverty, 
employment, and growth. M aking permanent the liberalized rules o f origin o f the CBTPA Treaty 
increases the annual rate o f growth o f GDP by 1.3 percent and employment growth by 1.4 
percent, relative to what they would have been had CAFTA not been approved. That has a 
dramatic impact on poverty and the distribution o f household income because so many of the 
new workers are unskilled women from poor families. W e estimate that by 2020, maquila will 
lower the poverty rate by 6 percentage points and the Gini coefficient by 3 percentage points 
relative to the tax cut scenario. All o f these results underline the critical importance o f job 
creation in increasing the growth rate o f the economy and lowering its poverty rate. However, 
because the maquila benefits under CAFTA are not a change from current treatment but rather a 
conversion from a temporary to a permanent benefit, approving CAFTA will not raise the growth 
rate o f the economy by 1.3 percent, relative to its current growth trajectory. Rather, without 
CAFTA, we project that the economy will grow 1.3 percent less than it would if  the maquila 
benefits o f the CBTPA are made permanent.
The key to growth and poverty reduction in Honduras lies in finding a way to create more 
jobs, particularly for the unskilled. M aquila is one way to do this. It changes skill intensity in the 
economy progressively without increasing overall capital requirements. But CAFTA needs to be 
complemented by policies that stimulate more capital formation as well. Higher rates o f capital 
formation as demonstrated in the FD I scenario have a large and positive impact on growth, 
employment, and poverty. Unfortunately, there is no assurance that the effects o f CAFTA on
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foreign investment will actually lead to the higher rates o f investment that we used in our 
simulation. CAFTA is not a magic bullet. By itself it will not solve Honduras’s problems of 
poverty and slow growth. For that, complementary policies that make agriculture more 
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Appendix A  
SUPPLEM ENTARY TABLE
Table A.1
GROWTH RATES OF TRADE BY SECTOR
Initial Annual percentage growth rate (1997-2020)
share 




Banana 7.71 1.01 1.49 1.38 1.01 1.80 4.39
Coffee 7.08 2.01 2.33 2.68 2.01 2.95 6.66
Mining 2.65 2.08 2.54 2.55 2.08 2.91 5.88
Livestock 0.40 2.92 3.12 4.93 2.92 5.08 6.27
Non-trad. Ag. 11.28 2.45 2.58 3.21 2.45 3.32 5.93
Subsist. Ag. 0.06 3.02 3.17 4.57 3.02 4.69 6.19
Food 25.74 2.88 3.09 4.27 2.88 4.45 6.4
Textiles 5.26 2.19 2.34 3.31 2.19 3.43 5.93
Paper 2.64 2.30 2.48 2.95 2.30 3.09 5.93
Chemicals 1.20 2.25 2.45 3.11 2.25 3.27 5.01
Metals 0.44 2.70 2.91 3.50 2.70 3.68 6.03
Other mfg. 12.57 2.23 2.71 3.00 2.24 3.41 5.72
Elec, water, 0.06 2.67 2.83 3.40 2.67 3.53 6.02
Hotels 8.09 2.50 2.68 4.60 2.50 4.71 5.82
Transport 4.82 2.69 2.95 3.29 2.69 3.51 6.5
Finance 1.00 2.43 2.52 3.00 2.44 3.07 5.63





2.74 2.84 3.47 2.74 3.55 6.22
Imports
Banana 0.03 3.37 3.62 4.37 3.37 4.62 6.06
Coffee 0.00 3.94 4.21 5.14 3.94 5.42 8.13
Mining 10.62 2.94 3.16 3.91 2.94 4.11 6.42
Livestock 4.73 3.42 3.68 4.51 3.43 4.75 6.49
Non-trad. Ag 4.82 3.36 3.63 4.80 3.36 5.06 6.5
Subsist. Ag. 0.01 3.55 3.71 4.66 3.56 4.81 6.5
Food 0.00 3.57 3.64 4.64 3.58 4.71 6.72
Textiles 6.46 3.39 3.65 -24.56 3.40 -24.37 6.46
Paper 3.54 2.87 3.12 3.92 2.88 4.13 6.21




Initial Annual percentage growth rate (1997-2020)
share 
1997 a/ Base CAFTA Maquila Quotas
All
CAFTA FDI
Metals 6.35 3.26 3.48 4.37 3.27 4.56 6.42
Other mfg. 15.51 3.32 3.48 4.32 3.32 4.47 6.66
Elec,water 0.15 3.17 3.52 4.73 3.17 5.05 6.17
Construction 0.08 3.76 3.99 4.92 3.76 5.14 6.86
Hotels 2.27 3.41 3.51 4.47 3.42 4.56 6.23
Transport 11.95 3.34 3.46 4.47 3.34 4.58 6.85
Finance 2.00 3.38 3.56 4.65 3.39 4.80 6.47
Personal svc. 1.65 3.37 3.49 4.42 3.38 4.52 6.53
Government 0.25 3.65 3.76 4.75 3.65 4.85 6.81





DOCUM ENTATION OF THE SOCIAL ACCOUNTING M ATRIX, HOUSEHOLD  
SURVEY FOR HONDURAS, AND TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION  
OF THE RECURSIVE DYNAMIC CGE
a) The Social Accounting M atrix for 1997
The Social Accounting M atrix (SAM) used in this study is based on the 1997 SAM 
developed by Jose Cuesta and described in Cuesta (2005). First, this SAM distinguishes between 
accounts for “activities” (the entities that carry out production) and “commodities” (markets for 
goods and services). The receipts are valued at producer prices in the activity accounts and at 
market prices in the commodity accounts (including indirect commodity taxes and transaction 
costs). Activity outputs are either exported or sold domestically, while commodities comprise 
domestic supply and imports. This separation o f activities from commodities is preferred because 
it permits activities to produce multiple commodities (for example, a dairy activity may produce 
both cheese and milk, which are delivered to different commodity markets). And any commodity 
may be produced by multiple activities (for example, the same maize commodity may be 
produced by both small- and large-scale production activities.
Second, the matrix explicitly associates trade flows with transactions (trade and 
transportation) costs, also referred to as marketing margins. For each commodity, the SAM 
accounts for the transaction costs associated with domestic, import, and export marketing. For 
domestic marketing o f domestic output, the marketing margin represents the cost o f moving the 
commodity from the producer to the domestic market. For imports, it represents the cost of 
moving the commodity from the border (adding to the c.i.f. price) to the domestic market. For 
exports, it shows the cost o f moving the commodity from the producer to the border (reducing the 
price received by producers relative to the f.o.b. price).
Third, the government is disaggregated into a core government account and various tax 
collection accounts, one for each tax type. This disaggregation is often necessary because the 
economic interpretation o f some payments may otherwise be ambiguous. In any given 
application, the SAM may exclude any (or all) o f these specific tax collection accounts. In the 
SAM, payments between the government and other domestic institutions represent government 
transfers.
Fourth, the domestic nongovernment institutions in the SAM consist o f households and 
enterprises. The enterprises earn factor incomes (reflecting their ownership o f capital or land or 
both) and may also receive transfers from other institutions. Enterprises pay corporate (direct) 
taxes, save, and transfer profits to other institutions. Assuming that the relevant data are 
available, it is preferable to have one or more accounts for enterprises when these have tax 
obligations and savings behavior that are independent o f and different from the household sector. 
Enterprises should be disaggregated in a manner that captures differences across various
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enterprise types in terms o f tax rates, savings rates, and the shares o f retained earnings that are 
received by different household types.
Finally, the SAM distinguishes between own home consumption, which is activity based, 
and marketed consumption, which is commodity based. Home consumption, which in the SAM 
appears as household payments to activities, is valued at producer prices. Household 
consumption o f marketed commodities appears as payments from household accounts to 
commodity accounts, the values o f which include marketing margins and commodity taxes.
The 1997 macro SAM for Honduras uses as data sources the national accounts prepared 
by the Central Bank; information on capital flows from the Ministry o f Finance; data on labor 
behavior and on income and expenditure from the Permanent Household Survey (EPH) and 
Incomes and Expenditures National Household Survey (ENIGH) household surveys, 
respectively. Final household consumption, private investment, public investment, government 
recurrent and investment expenditures, value added, remittances, net capital inflows, interest 
payments, and other factor payments abroad all come from the national accounts and balance of 
payments. Exports (at f.o.b.), imports (at c.i.f.), government savings, and all categories o f taxes 
come from the Honduras Ministry o f Finance statistical sourcebook The proportion o f self­
consumption in total household consumption is estimated at 12.6 percent from the ENIGH 1997 
household survey. The distribution o f value added between households and firms results from 
initially pro-rating total value added with a 60-40 percent thumb rule for labor and capital, 
respectively. Government transfers to firms include net public transfers to public enterprises 
providing electricity, water, sanitation, telephone, and forestry-related services.
Government transfers to households include subsidy schemes to public transportation, 
residential electricity consumption, family allowances, schooling grants and scholarships, among 
others. Transaction costs are estimated, assuming a 15 percent share o f the gross domestic 
supply, exports, and imports, respectively. This estimated share is in line with estimated margin 
costs for the transportation o f food, agricultural products, and manufactures reported by Gehlhar 
(1998) as part o f the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) 21 worldwide project. The net 
domestic supply entry is estimated as the difference between gross domestic output, exports, 
households’ self-consumption, and transaction costs. The government investment deficit is the 
residual that balances out the total government recurrent column, while intermediate demand is 
the entry that allows the gross output total to balance out. Categories o f taxes are aggregated into 
two indirect taxes (one on production, the other on sales), tariffs, export taxes, export subsidies, 
and direct income taxes.
Activities and commodities are disaggregated in 24 categories (Table A.2.1). Each 
activity is the only producer o f its respective commodity. Agriculture is disaggregated into 
subsistence products (mainly grains), traditional, and nontraditional exports. Traditional 
agriculture exports further separate bananas, coffee, and sugar, which in addition to 
nonagricultural traditional exports (such as forestry, livestock, and mining) constitute the most 
relevant traditional exports in Honduras. As for manufactures, textiles— mainly in the form of
21 The University of Purdue’s Center for Global Trade Analysis conducts the Global Trade 
Analysis Project, which provides among other things information on the composition of domestic 
production and trade for a large set of commodities and countries in the world.
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maquila production— can be singled out from paper, chemical, and other manufactures. Given its 
importance to consumption, and ultimately, to poverty, the category o f food, beverages, and 
tobacco manufactures is also accounted for separately from other manufactures.
Public and private services are initially separated as well. Government services aggregate 
defense, administration, and social security into a single category. Private services are 
disaggregated into hospitality, transportation, financial, personal, social, and community services, 
and other services. Interestingly, other services refer mainly to housing services, thus 
distinguishing them from financial services. This is a practice followed by the national accounts, 
which avoids a misleading perception that a jo in t financial and housing sector dominates the 
Honduran economy. Electricity, gas, and water provision constitute another independent activity. 
Oil, commerce, and construction are also considered as three individual activities. As a result, 
activities and commodities are disaggregated into the following categories: bananas; coffee; 
sugar; mining; livestock; forestry; nontraditional exports; subsistence agriculture; oil; food, 
beverage, and tobacco manufactures; textile manufactures; paper manufactures; chemical 
manufactures; metal, mineral, and machinery manufactures; other manufactures; electricity, gas, 
and water; construction; commerce; hotel and restaurant services; transportation services; 
financial services; personal, social, and community services; and government services.
The intermediate demand total is disaggregated by commodities and activities, using a 
special tabulation provided by the Central Bank o f Honduras. This tabulation provides the 
proportion o f commodities that a given activity requires for its normal production. The 
disaggregation o f commodities and activities for the 1997 micro SAM  follows the same 
categorization o f the system provided by the Central Bank except for a minor aggregation of 
formal and informal commerce into a single category. As for the disaggregation o f domestic 
supply, the available information on the value added o f each activity is added to its estimated 
intermediate demand to come up with a gross domestic supply per activity.
The factorial classification in the 1997 micro SAM  distinguishes two production factors, 
labor and capital (Table A2-2). The capital factor also includes land, given that estimating stocks 
and value added for land from existing EPH household surveys is a completely unreliable 
possibility. Labor factors are disaggregated into statistically meaningful categories as much as 
data permit. Labor is separated according to skill, occupation (wage earners versus self­
employed), and gender. An intermediate skill (5-9  schooling years) category is differentiated 
from low (0-4) and high (10 or more) skill levels. This distinction between unskilled and 
intermediate skilled labor and by gender could be useful in future policy simulations, but it 
played no part in the simulations reported in the paper, since we set the wages o f the two labor 
categories for the two genders equal and assumed an excess supply o f both factors. The 
combination o f skill, occupation, and gender categories results in 12 labor factor types. W age 
earners are defined as those receiving wages and salaries as their primary source o f (labor) 
income. The remaining category brings together employers, self-employed, and unpaid relatives 
in a single category.
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Table B.1
ACTIVITY AND COMMODITY CATEGORIES FOR THE SOCIAL 
ACCOUNTING MATRIX, HONDURAS, 1997
Sectors and sub-sectors Description
1. Agriculture, Mining, 
Fishing and Livestock






1.b) Non traditional NTA A Non traditional exports
exports
1.c) Subsistence SUB_A Subsistence agricultural
agricultural products
1.d) Oil and derivatives OIL A Oil





MET_A Metal, mineral and 
machinery manufactures
OMA_A Other manufactures
3. Construction CON_A Construction
4. Commerce COM_A Commerce
5. Services HOT_A Hotel and restaurants
TPT_A Transport, storage and 
communication
FIN_A Financial and insurance 
services
PER_A Personal, social and 
community services
GOV_A Government services





LABOR CATEGORIES, SOCIAL ACCOUNTING MATRIX, HONDURAS, 1997
Labor Category Description
Skill Schooling years Occupation Gender
TUWM Unskilled 0-4 Wage earner Male
TUNM Unskilled 0-4 Non wage earner Male
TIWM Semi-skilled 5-9 Wage earner Male
TINM Semi-skilled 5-9 Non wage earner Male
TSWM Skilled 10+ Wage earner Male
TSNM Skilled 10+ Non wage earner Male
TUWF Unskilled 0-4 Wage earner Female
TUNF Unskilled 0-4 Non wage earner Female
TIWF Semi-skilled 5-9 Wage earner Female
TINF Semi-skilled 5-9 Non wage earner Female
TSWF Skilled 10+ Wage earner Female
TSNF Skilled 10+ Non wage earner Female
Source: Cuesta (2005).
Note: The composition of the labor factor does not add up to 100% due to rounding 
error. Total labor factor amounts to 2,145,753 individuals.
Formally, factors generate value added in the economy. The aggregated value added of 
labor is distributed among activities proportionally to their share in the labor income mass 
reported by EPH 1997. Despite this disaggregation o f labor, value added is straightforward, the 
capital value added generated among activities is more troublesome. Honduras lacks estimates on 
capital stocks, let alone its distribution by activity. Following the stylization o f W obst (1998) 
using GTAP worldwide data, capital value added is first assigned among agricultural and 
nonagricultural activities. It is assumed that capital value added among agricultural activities 
amounts to 60 percent o f total value added in these activities (Wobst 1998). For the remaining 
activities, capital value added represents only 40 percent o f their total value added. Then these 
two subcategories o f capital value added are further disaggregated, using worldwide average 
estimates on specific activities as reported in W obst (1998). Although this option does not truly 
reflect a Honduras-specific distribution o f capital value added (but a worldwide average instead), 
alternative options are regarded as nonsensical. Among such alternatives, one might have pro­
rated the distributions o f capital and labor value added alike. Also, the number o f activities 
considered causes us to reject an arbitrary allocation o f shares o f capital value added, based on 
perceptions o f what constitutes a capital intensive sector in the Honduran economy.
As for households, these receive incomes from labor factors, an “operating surplus” from 
firms and remittances from the rest o f the world. EPH 1997 data on labor incomes and the 
economic sector allow us to estimate the proportion o f labor value added generated by each 
category o f labor factor, and its reception among different categories o f households. F irm s’ 
transfers to households are distributed following the proportion o f total interest and dividends of 
each household category, as reported in EPH 1997. Similarly, remittances are assigned to each 
category o f households according to the proportion o f total remittances reported in the EPH 1997 
survey.
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From an expenditure point o f view, households produce goods that are self-consumed, 
consume other goods and services, pay taxes, and save. The distribution o f consumption by 
household category accrues from the ENIGH 1998/99 survey, assuming that the composition of 
consumption between 1997 and the period o f the survey did not change significantly. Given the 
low level o f individuals reporting self-consumption in the ENIGH survey, the distribution o f this 
category o f household consumption is pro-rated according to the share o f each household 
category in final household consumption. Savings are estimated as the average difference 
between incomes and expenditures reported by each category o f household in the ENIGH survey. 
The relative share o f each household category in total savings is then applied to the 1997 macro 
SAM figure to obtain distribution o f savings consistent with the micro SAM.
As for the remaining transactions, taxes on sales are specified proportionally to the 
relative weight that each commodity represents on total domestic supply. Sales taxes as well as 
production taxes (except for special production taxes on cigarettes, beer, nonalcoholic drinks, and 
oil) are subject to balancing adjustments (see the next section). Income taxes are assigned among 
household categories on a proportional basis with respect to their reported average total income. 
Similarly, both private and public investments are assigned proportionally to the relative weight 
that each commodity has on total intermediate demand. Finally, transaction costs are distributed 
by commodities also in proportion to the share o f each commodity in domestic supply, imports, 
and exports, respectively.
b) Final adjustments
The entropy approach is used to obtain the final balanced SAM for this project (Robinson 
and others 2000). However, in 1997 there was a large payment from enterprises to the rest o f the 
world that is not consistent with national accounts data for preceding years and unlikely to 
represent future behavior. W e eliminated this flow by 2005, which is one o f the reasons that the 
model has a different trajectory between 1997 and 2005 from the later growth path to 2020.
The actual SAM is a square 87 x 87 matrix comprised o f 24 activity accounts; 24 
commodity accounts; 13 factor o f production accounts (12 labor and 1 capital); 1 enterprise 
account; 6 government accounts (5 o f which disaggregate tax receipts); 16 different types of 
households, depending on residence and gender head; a saving-investm ent account; an external 
account; and row -colum n sums. The actual matrix is available on the IFPRI website. 
www.ifpri.org/ data/honduras02.asp
Table B.3
NATIONAL SOCIAL ACCOUNTING MATRIX USED IN THE CGE MODEL
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FORM AL STATEMENT OF THE DYNAMIC CGE MODEL
Table C.1 
THE DYNAMIC CGE MODEL
SETS
Symbol Explanation Symbol Explanation
a  G A Activities c G C M N  (c  C  ) commodities not in CM
a  g  A C E S (c A ) 
a  g A L E O ( c  A ) 
c G C
activities with a CES function at 
the top of the technology nest 
activities with a Leontief function 
at the top of the technology nest
Commodities
c g C T (c 
c G C X (c 
f  G F






c g C D ( c  C ) commodities with domestic sales 
of domestic output i g IN S
institutions (domestic and rest of 
world)
c g C D N  (c C  ) commodities not in CD i G IN S D  ( c IN S  ) domestic institutions
c g C E  (c C  ) exported commodities i g IN S D N G (c  IN SD ) domestic non-government institutions
c g C E N  (c C  ) commodities not in CE h  g H (c IN S D N G ) households
c g C M  (c C ) imported commodities f l s  g F factors with supply curve
PARAMETERS
cw tsc weight of commodity c in the CPI qgc








weight of commodity c in the 
producer price index 
quantity of c as intermediate input 
per unit of activity a 
quantity of commodity c as trade 
input per unit o f c' produced and 
sold domestically 
quantity of commodity c as trade 
input per exported unit o f c' 
quantity of commodity c as trade 
input per imported unit o f c' 
quantity of aggregate intermediate 







base-year quantity of private 
investment demand 
share for domestic institution i in 
income of factor f
share of net income of i' to i (i' g 
INSDNG'; i g INSDNG)
Tax rate for activity a
export tax rate





m p s t
m ps01l
P w ec
p w m c
q d stc
etalsf
IN V SH R 1a
DKAPSa
W F X A V
quantity of aggregate intermediate 
input per activity unit 
base savings rate for domestic 
institution i
0-1 parameter with 1 for 
institutions with potentially flexed 
direct tax rates
export price (foreign currency) 
import price (foreign currency)
quantity of stock change 
parameter in labor supply equation
capital shares
gross fixed capital formation 









d ep ra tek
exogenous direct tax rate for domestic 
institution i
0-1 parameter with 1 for institutions 
with potentially flexed direct tax rates
import tariff rate 
rate of sales tax
transfer from factor f  to institution i 
rate of value-added tax for activity a
price of capital
next period sectoral capital stock 
capital stock depreciation rate
Greek Letters
efficiency parameter in the CES activity 
function
efficiency parameter in the CES value-added 
function












Armington function shift parameter
CET function shift parameter
marginal share of consumption spending on 
home commodity c from activity a for 
household h
marginal share of consumption spending on 
marketed commodity c for household h
CES activity function share parameter
share parameter for domestic commodity 
aggregation function











CET function share parameter
CES value-added function share parameter 
for factor f in activity a 
subsistence consumption of marketed 
commodity c for household h 
subsistence consumption of home 
commodity c from activity a for household h
yield of output c per unit of activity a 
CES production function exponent
CES value-added function exponent
domestic commodity aggregation function 
exponent




D T IN S
F S A V
consumer price index
change in domestic institution tax share (= 0 
for base; exogenous variable)
foreign savings (FCU)
M P S A D J
Q F S f
T IN S A D J
G A D J  government consumption adjustment factor W F D IS T ,
savings rate scaling factor (= 0 for base) 
quantity supplied of factor
direct tax scaling factor (= 0 for base; 
exogenous variable)






IAD J investment adjustment factor
D M PS change in domestic institution savings rates (= 0 for base; exogenous variable) QFfa quantity demanded of factor f  from activity a
D PI
producer price index for domestically
QGc
government consumption demand for
marketed output commodity
EG government expenditures Q H ch
quantity consumed of commodity c by 
household h
E H h consumption spending for household QHAach
quantity of household home consumption of 
commodity c from activity a for household h
EXR exchange rate (LCU per unit o f FCU) QINTAa quantity of aggregate intermediate input
GOVSHR government consumption share in nominal QINTca quantity of commodity c as intermediateabsorption input to activity a
G SAV government savings QINVc quantity of investment demand for commodity
INVSHR investment share in nominal absorption Q M c quantity of imports of commodity
M PS i marginal propensity to save for domestic non- QQC
quantity of goods supplied to domestic
government institution (exogenous variable) market (composite supply)
PAa activity price (unit gross revenue) Q T
quantity of commodity demanded as trade 
input
PDDc demand price for commodity produced and 
sold domestically QVAa quantity of (aggregate) value-added
PD S supply price for commodity produced and sold Q X c
aggregated quantity o f domestic output of
domestically commodity
PEc export price (domestic currency) QXACac
quantity of output of commodity c from 
activity a
PINTAa aggregate intermediate input price for activity a TABS total nominal absorption
P M C import price (domestic currency) TINSi direct tax rate for institution i (i e INSDNG)
PQc composite commodity price TRn„
transfers from institution i ’ to i (both in the 
set INSDNG)
PVAa value-added price (factor income per unit of activity) WFREALf average real price of factor
P X C aggregate producer price for commodity WFf average price of factor
PXACac producer price of commodity c for activity a YFf income o f factor f
QAa quantity (level) o f activity YG government revenue
QDc quantity sold domestically o f domestic output YI<
income o f domestic non-government 
institution







P M c = pw m c • ( 1 + tmc ) • EXR + £  PQ c, • icm„
Domain
import: import: tariff
price = price adjust -
( LCU ) ( FCU ) ment
exchange rate
( LCU per 
FCU )
cost of trade 
inputs per 
import unit
PEc = pw-ec • ( 1 -  tec ) • EXR -  £  PQ C • icec
c 'gCT
export export tariff
price = price adjust -
( LCU ) ( FCU ) ment
exchange rate 
( LCU per 
FCU )
cost of trade 
inputs per 
export unit
P D D c = P D S c + £  P Q C - ic d &
c 'gCT
domestic domestic
demand = supply +
price price















PXc • QXc = PDSc • QDc + PEc • QEc
producer price domestic supply price export price
times marketed = times + times
output quantity domestic sales quantity export quantity










(CD u  CM )





















PINTA„ =  2  PQc ■>'ica„
ceC
aggregate intermediate input cost
intermediate = per unit of aggregate
input price intermediate input
PAa • (1 -  taa) • QAa = PVAa • QVAa +  PINTAa • QINTAa
8 activity price value-added






i ntermedi ate 
input price times 
quantity
C P I  =  2  P Q c -cw tsc
prices times 
weights[cpi] =
D P I  = 2  P D S c ■d w ts i
10
Producer price index prices times
for non-traded outputs weights
Production and commodity block





quantity of aggregate value-added, 
quantity aggregate intermediate input 
1
f PIN T A a 5 a )
a PVAa 1 - 5.a J
12
value-added - r  - ,intermediate-inputintermediate-









a  e  A  intermediate 
input price




























QINTAa = lntaa ■ QAt
f




a e  ALEO
15
16
QVAa = a  a ■ I  K  ■ QFfa
V f  eF
-Pa Pã
quantity of aggregate = CES factorvalue-added inputs
(
Wf ■ WFDIST fa = PVAa ■ (1 -  tvaa ) ■ QVAa ■ I  Sv/ a ■ QF}
V f  eF'
fa ■Sf • QFf -f  a Ü fa
marginal cost of 
factor f  in activity a
marginal re-venue product 
of factor f  in activity a
a e  A
a e  A 
f  e  F
17
YF
WFREALf = --------- ==----
f  CPI * I  QFf
average real wage 
per factor unit
f
average wage corrcected 
by consumer index price




QFSf = QFS 0*





QINTca = icaca ■ QINTAa
intermediate demand aggregate intermediate
for commodity c = f input quantity
from activity a for activity a
QXACac + I  QHAach =dac  ■ QAa
heH
marketed quantity 




of commodity c 
from activity a
production 
of commodity c 
from activity a
f  e  F
a e  A 
c e  C
a e  A  























QXc =aa £ S Z  • QX A Ca - Pc
pa -1
aggregate activity-specific
marketed = c e s marketedproduction of production of
commodity c commodity c
Output 
c G C X  Aggregation 
Function
22




marginal cost of com­
modity c from activity a
marginal revenue product of 
commodity c from activity a
a g A 







QXc = ac • \õ tc -Q Ep;  + ( l - S f  • Q DPc \ Pc
aggregate marketed 
domestic output = c e t
export quantity, domestic 
sales of domestic output




















sales of domestic + exports [ for
domestic output output [ forc g  (CD n CEN)]
c g  (CE n CDN)]




















import quantity, domestic 
use of domestic output
Q Dc
PDDc




demand ratio = f
domestic-import 
price ratio
c g  (CM n CD)










QQ C = Q D c+ Q M C
28 composite = marketed domestic + imports [ forsupply output [ for c e (CM n CDN)]
c e (CD n CMN)]
Q T C = I  ( c c '  ■ Q M c' + icecc' ■ QEc' + icdcc' ■ Q D c')
c ' e C '
29 demand for sum of demands
transactions = for imports, exports,




(CM n CDN )











sum of activity payments 
(activity-specific wages 
times employment levels)
YIFi f sh if  f  ■ [ (  -  tff  ) ■ YFf  -  trnsfrrow f ■ EXR
income of share of income income of factor f
institution i = of factor f  to (net of tax and
from factor f institution i transfer to RoW)
YIt = I  Y IF f + I  TR1IU,+ trnsfrigm! ■ CPI + trnsfrimw ■ EXR








+ from + from
government RoW
TRIIi i' = shiii i' ■ (1 -M P Sr )  ■ (1- TINSf )  ■ YIf
transfer from 
institution i' to i
income of institution 
i', net of savings and 
direct taxes
share of net income 
of institution i' 
transfered to i
{ \
1 -  I  shiih  .(1 - M P S h y (1 -T IN S J ■ YI.




household income, net of direct 
taxes, savings, and transfers to 
other non-government institutions
f  e  F
i e  INSD 
f  e  F
i e INSDNG
i e INSDNG 
i ' e INSDNG '




























QHch = Tch +■





household demand = f
consumption
for commodity c spending,
L J market price
c e  C  
h e  H
36
P P
QHAach = r lh  +-
E H h -  2 P Q , • r Yh - 2 2  P X A C ac. • Yhac ' h
c ' e C aeA c'eC
PXAC„
quantity of household
household demand = f disposablefor home commodity c income,
from activity a producer price
a  e  A  
c e  C  












QGc = G A D J^qgc
government adjustment factor
consumption = times
demand for base-year government
commodity c consumption
YG = 2  TINS, •YI, + 2 t f f YFf  + 2 tvaa-PVAa-QVAa
f  eF
c e  C IN V
c e  C
+2 taa-PAa-QAa + 2 Mc' FWmc'QM c'EXR +2 ̂  pwec'QEc'E.
ae A ceCM ceCE
+2  tqc • PQc ■ QQc + 2  YFgov f  + trnsfrgov rm • EXR
ce C f  eF
r i direct taxes direct taxes value-government = from + from + addedre-venue institutions factors tax


























EG  = £  PQc ■ QGc + £  trm jr ,^ . ■ CPI
40
government government +spending consumption
i g INSDNG









£  QFfa = QF S ,
a g A
demand for supply of
factor f factor f
QQc = £  QINTca + £  Q M c  + QGc
aG A hG M
+QINVc + qdstc + QTc
composite intermediate + household + government
supply use consumption consumption
L -1 L -1 L
fixed + stock + trade
in-vestment change input use
£  pwMc •Q M c + £  trnsfrrow f  = £  p Wec • QEc + £  trnsfrit
f  G F












YG = EG  + G SAV
government = government + governmentrevenue expenditures savings
TINSi = tinsi • (1 + TINSADJ • tinsO 1t ) + D TINS • tinsO 1t
direct tax base rate adjusted point change i g INSDNG institutional tax
rate for = for scaling for + for selected rates
institution i selected institutions institutions
M PSi = m pst ■ (1 + M PSAD J • mpsO 1t j + D M PS • mpsO 1t
savings base rate adjusted point change i g INSDNG
rate for = for scaling for + for selected














I  M PSi ■ (1 - TINSt)■ YIt + G SAV + E X R ■ F SA V
INSDNG




TABS = I I PQc ■QHch + I I I PXACac ■ QHAt
he H ce C aeA ceC heH
+I  PQc ■ QGc + 1 PQc ■ QINVc + 1 PQ.
total household household= market + homeabsorption consumption consumption
+
-1 L~
government + fixed + stockconsumption investment change























I  QF,a  t
■ WFf t ■ WFDIST, a t
_V a J
average capital weighted sum of sectors'
rental rate capital rental rates
Savings-
Investment
non-govern­ + government + foreign = Balancement savings savings savings






















INVSMR1af  at = Q Ff  a t
£  Q f
V a '
f  f  
F
V V




share of share of capital rental
new capital existing capital rate ratio
ADKAPSa a t = INVSMR1af  a r
£  PQc t • QINVc t
P K f  t
quantity of new share of total quantity of
capital by sector new capital new capital
P K f t = £  PQc
QINVc t 
£  Qi n v c, t
unit price weighted market price
of capital of in-vestment commodities
QFf a +1 = QFff  a t 1+-




average capital weighted sum of sectors'
rental rate capital rental rates
Q FSf t+1 = QFSf  t
£  AINVSMRl f  a t









sector's share of 



















P M c = pw m c • ( 1 + tmc ) • EXR + 2  PQ c’ • icm„
c 'eCT
import import tariff exchange rate cost of trade
price = price adjust - ( LCU per + inputs per
( LCU ) ( FCU ) ment FCU ) import unit
PEc = pwec •( 1 -  tec )  EXR -  2  P Q c'iice„
c 'eCT
export export tariff
price = price adjust -




cost of trade 
inputs per 
export unit
p d d c = PDSc + 2  PQ e-icdc ,
c 'eCT
domestic domestic
demand = supply +
price price















PXc • QXc = PDSc • QDc + PEc • QEc
producer price domestic supply price export price
times marketed = times + times
output quantity domestic sales quantity export quantity






c e  C M  Import Price
c e  CE  Export Price
Demand price of 
c e  CD  domestic non­
traded goods
c e
(CD u  CM )















PINTA, = I  PQc ■ iicac
aggregate intermediate input cost
intermediate = per unit of aggregate
input price intermediate input
PAa ■ (1 -  taa ) ■ QAa = PVAa ■ QVAa + PINTAa ■ QINTAa




+ input price times 
quantity
CPI = I  PQc • cwtsc
prices times 
weights[cpi] =
D P I = I  PD Sc ■ dwtsc
ceC
Producer price index prices times
for non-traded outputs weights
a e  A
















QAa = a :  (  ■ QVAa~P + (1 s , ) ■ QINTAt -Pa P
activity = CESlevel
QVAa
QINTAa V PVAa 1 - Sa J
quantity of aggregate value-added, 
quantity aggregate intermediate input 
1
1+Paf  PINTAa s ,  ^




- value-addedinput quantity 
ratio price ratio






a e A C E S
























QINTAa = intaa •QA
f













V f  GF
Pa
quantity of aggregate = CES factorvalue-added inputs
(
a g A
• • WFDIST fa = PVAa • (1 -  tvaa ) • QVAa • £  ÔJa • QFfa~
V f  gF '
• QFf
- P a -1
marginal cost of 
factor f  in activity a
marginal revenue product 
of factor f  in activity a
a g A 






YFWFREALr  = -  _
f  CPI * £Q F f
average real wage 
per factor unit
f
average wage corrcected 
by consumer index price




QFSf = QFS 0*





QINTca = icaa • QINTAa
intermediate demand aggregate intermediate
for commodity c = f input quantity
from activity a for activity a
QXACac + £  QMAach =Sac • QAa
hGM
marketed quantity 




of commodity c 
from activity a
production 
of commodity c 
from activity a
f  G F  Labor supply
a g A  Disaggregated
C  intermediate
c G C input demand
a G A  Commodity
production and 










marketed -C E S marketedproduction of production of
commodity c commodity c
Output












marginal cost of com­
modity c from activity a
J
marginal revenue product of 
commodity c from activity a
Q X C -  a l ■\Stc -Q EPc + (1 -S t )  ■ QDPc \ Pc
aggregate marketed 
domestic output CET
QEc -  (  PEc ■ 1_Sc V  
QDc V PDSc sc J
export quantity, domestic 











sales of domestic + exports [ for
domestic output output [ forc e (CD n CEN)]
c e (CE n CDN)]






import quantity, domestic 
use of domestic output 
1
PD D c sq
c P M c  1 - sq  j
1+Pp
import-domestic 
demand ratio = f
domestic-import 
price ratio
a e  A 
c e  C X
c e (CE n CD)
c e (CE n CD)
c e
(CD n CEN )
u
(CE u CDN )
c e (CM n CD)



























Q Q c= Q D c+ QMc
domestic use of
composite marketed domestic + imports [ for (CM r  CDN ) outputs and
supply output [ for c e (CM r  CDN)] non-produced
c e (CD r  CMN)] imports
Q T c = 2  ( c c  • Q M c + icecc • QEc + icdcc • QDc)
c ' e C '
demand for sum of demands
transactions = for imports, exports,
services and domestic sales
c e Composite
(CD rCMN ) supply for non-
u imported
Demand for 










sum of activity payments 
(activity-specific wages 
times employment levels)
YIF,i f s h f  f  • [ (  -  tff  \ YFf  -  trnsfrr0w f •EXR
income of share of income income of factor f
institution i = of factor f  to (net of tax and
from factor f institution i transfer to RoW)








+ from + from
government RoW
f  e  F  Factor income
i e INSD
f  e  F
Institutional 
factor incomes
YI, = 2  YIF, r + 2  TRII,r + trnsfr< ¡a, • CPI + tmsfr, • EXR
Income of 





TRII, i = shii, i • (1 -M P S, ) f 1 -  TINSi )  • YI,
transfer from 
institution i' to i
E H h
income of institution 
i', net of savings and 
direct taxes
share of net income 
of institution i' 
transfered to i
{ \
1 -  2  shiiih -(1 - M PShy O - H N S J - Y I ,,




household income, net of direct 
taxes, savings, and transfers to 
other non-government institutions
i e INSDNG
i ' e INSDNG '












QH ch = Ych +■
EHh -  £  PQc' • Y h  -  £  £  PXACac' • y Y
PQc
quantity of household
household demand -  f
consumption
for commodity c spending,
-1 market price







QHAfch -  yL  +-
EHh -  £ PQ ,-rY„- £ £ p x a c „. • y hac 'h
PXAC
quantity of household
household demand - f disposablefor home commodity c income,
from activity a producer price








QGc -  GAD J • qgc
government adjustment factor
consumption - times
demand for base-year government
commodity c consumption
YG = £  TINS, •YI, + £ tff •YFf  +£tvaa • PVAa • QVAf
f  gF
+ £ tff • PAf • QAf + £  tmc • pwmc • QMc •EXR+ £  tec -pwec • QEc •EXR
y g  A cgCM cgCE
+£tPc • PQc • QQc + £YFgovf + trnsjrgoVow • EXR
cg C , gF
r -, direct taxes direct taxes value-government from + from + addedrevenueL J institutions factors tax








y  g A 

























EG  _ I  PQc ■ QGc + I  t r n s f - ^ - C P I
government government +spending consumption
i e INSDNG








I  QFf, _ QFSf
a e A
demand for supply of
factor f factor f
QQc = I  QINTcc + I  QHch +  QGC
he H
+QINVC + qdstc + QTc
composite _ intermediate + household + governmentsupply use consumption consumption
L -1 L -1 L
fixed + stock + trade
in-vestment change input use
f  e  F
C




transfers _ export +
institutional
transfers + foreignspending to RoW revenue from RoW savings
YG = EG  + G SAV
government _ government + governmentrevenue expenditures savings
TINSi = tinsi ■ (1 + TINSADJ ■ tins01t ) + D TINS ■ tins0 \
45 direct tax base rate adjusted point change
rate for _ for scaling for + for selected
institution i selected institutions institutions
M PS i _ m pst ■ (1 + M PSAD J ■ mps0 \  ) + D M PS
46 savings base rate adjusted point change
rate for _ for scaling for + for selected



























2  M PS , • (1 -  TINS, y  Y j  + G SAV + E X R • F SA V
INSDNG




TABS = 2 2 PQc •QHch +2 2 2 PXACac • QHAt
he H ce C aeAceCheH
+2  PQc • QGC + 2  PQc • Qinvc + 2  PQc • qdstc
total household household= market + homeabsorption consumption consumption
+
L -1 L
government + fixed + stockconsumption investment change




















W F K A V f = 2
QFf  at
2  QFfa  t
•WFf  t •WFDISTf „ t
_V a J
average capital weighted sum of sectors'
rental rate capital rental rates
Savings-
47 investment
non-govern­ + government + foreign = balancement savings savings savings



















QF ,f a t











share of share of capital rental
new capital existing capital rate ratio
Sector’s share of 






AD KAPSf f t = I N W R 1 Yf  ,,,
£  PQc t • Q irn c ,
P K f  t
quantity of new share of total quantity of
capital by sector new capital new capital
P K f t = £  PQc
QINVc t 
£  Qinvc, t
unit price weighted market price
of capital of in-vestment commodities
QFf a t+1 = QF ff  a t 1+-
MNVSHR1 f  at
QF
-  depm te.
f  at
average capital weighted sum of sectors'
rental rate capital rental rates
Q FSf t + = QFSf  t
£  MNVSHR1 f  at
1 + —------ :— :------------- depratef
QFSf  t
average capital weighted sum of sectors'
















THE M ICROSIM ULATION MODULE
The basic input for the microsimulations o f the poverty and distribution impact o f the CAFTA 
scenarios is the 2004 national household survey entitled Encuesta Nacional de Condiciones de 
Vida (MECOVI) 22 It comprises a national sample o f 8,175 households. W e use the solution of 
the CGE for 2005 to get the base-period distribution o f the labor force across the households 
represented in the survey. W e then use the random procedure described in Vos, Taylor and Paes 
de Barros, 2002 and in more detail in Appendix J o f Sanchez (2004) to get an estimate o f the 
hypothetical level o f poverty and distribution o f income that would be observed in each o f the 
CAFTA scenarios. Each microsimulation is repeated 100 times to get a mean estimate and a 
standard error, enabling us to make statements regarding the significance o f the changes we 
found. The procedure is done sequentially, first for the change coming from the total growth in 
employment, holding skill structure and relative wages constant, and then sequentially allowing 
for changes in skill structure and relative wages.
The poverty lines are taken from CEPAL (2005), adjusted from 2002 to 2004 by changes 
in inflation. The moderate line is adjusted by the change in the CPI, while the extreme poverty 
line is adjusted by the change in the price o f food. The lines for the urban sector are 1,604 
lempiras per month per person for the upper line and 772 for the lower. For the rural sector, the 
lines are 988 for the moderate line and 544 for extreme poverty. In 2004 US dollars, those lines 
translate to $88 per month for moderate urban poverty and $54 for extreme urban poverty, and 
$42 and $28, respectively, for rural poverty. W e note that relative to other countries these poverty 
lines are quite high, particularly given that Honduras is a relatively poor country, which is one of 
the reasons that the level o f poverty in all o f our microsimulations is so high.
22 Program for the Improvement o f  Surveys and the Measurement o f  Living Conditions in Latin 
Am erica and the Caribbean (MECOVI).
